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REPORT
TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OF THE
DEFENSE AGENCY
REVIEW



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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ✓
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Agency Review

The attached report forwards the findings and recommendations developed during our exploratory review of the Defense Agencies. We have researched the evolution, roles, missions, and functions of the Agencies and conducted more than 200 interviews to determine if there seem to be problems which might be resolved by organizational change.

Based on our initial review, we had identified one central organizational issue and six potentially significant cross-cutting issues which are also organizational in nature. As I indicated in my interim report, the six secondary issues were developed primarily as the result of interviews conducted with officials in the Washington area and, therefore, were regarded as tentative. Since that time, however, I and my staff have visited six of the eight Unified and Specified Commands and several of the Component Commands. During the course of these visits we found no evidence which invalidated our issues. On the contrary, our trips to the field reinforced our belief that these are significant issues which need to be resolved if support and services provided to the combat forces by Defense Agencies are to become as efficient and effective as they could be.

We have, therefore, recommended that a deliberate and systematic follow-on study be undertaken which would provide you with a full range of organizational alternatives. We sincerely believe that the importance and complexity of the issues we have identified warrants such an effort. We further recommend that you direct implementation of various proposed measures that could be taken now to improve efficiency and readiness.

Theodore Antonelli
Major General, USA (Ret)
Project Director
Defense Agency Review

Attachment

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REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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PREFACE

This report is submitted in response to the request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense as part of the Defense Organization Study and presents the results of an exploratory review of the Defense Agencies.

I approached this assignment with the hope that it would be both challenging and rewarding. I have not been disappointed. If I did bring a bias to this study, it stems from my military experiences, both in a combat and support role, which were that military operations are essentially the products of unified and joint efforts; i.e. combined arms. I was also genuinely mindful of the need to maintain objectivity and neutrality in examining an organizational structure and concept which sometimes evokes emotional reactions from those who deplore Agencies as part of a trend to more and more centralization. This issue is not new. Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., in his book My Years with General Motors stated the issue succinctly when he said "good management rests on a reconciliation of centralization and decentralization, or 'decentralization with coordinated control'".

In conducting this Review, my staff and I examined the roles, missions, function, and organizational

relationships of the Defense Agencies in terms of their contribution to the national security responsibilities of the Department. Our charter was to conduct only an exploratory review, and present options for further study. Nonetheless, I have identified some interim changes which I believe would partially alleviate some of the problems we have found. I do not believe substantive changes should be contemplated or made pending more detailed analysis which confirms the wisdom and necessity of such action.

During the conduct of this Review I met with the Directors and Staffs of each Agency, reviewed appropriate legislation, visited CONUS and overseas field commands and, in conjunction with other members of my staff, conducted more than 200 interviews with senior military and civilian decisionmakers. I am very grateful to each and every individual for the time they so generously contributed and for the insights and recommendations they provided. I must emphasize that the Agency Directors and their Staffs were invariably cooperative and responsive. This report could not have been prepared without their

assistance. I am especially grateful to General David C. Jones who lent his full support to this study and to Dr. John White, whose suggestion that I look at functions as well as Agencies, proved so beneficial in sorting out the mass of data which had been collected.

I was ably assisted by the following military and civilian personnel who were assigned to my staff and who provided valuable expertise in the variety of specialties, from Intelligence to Logistics, which the Defense Agencies cover: Mr. A. V. Krochalis, Colonel James R. Anderson, USAF; Captain Richard N. Rounds, SC, USN, LTC Robert Sholar, USA; Major Len Vernamonti, USAF; Mr. James Wolbarsht, and Mr. Lewis E. Anderson. Others who made important contributions included Colonel Norman E. Ward, Jr., USA; Colonel Peter Petersen USA; Colonel Richard Daleski, USAF; and Captain Kenneth M. Stewart, USAF. I would also like to express my appreciation to Mrs. Sharan Nolan, Miss Helen Hackmann, Mrs. Joan March, Mrs. Marguerite Cowherd and Mrs. Karen Guillaume for the outstanding administrative support they provided to the group.

Finally, I am particularly indebted to my Study Director, John Bellinger, (Colonel, USA Retired), for his

wise counsel, steadfast assistance and insights.
Although this report is based on the mass of data
involved and reflects the opinion and counsel of
many, I am responsible for the conclusion and
recommendations contained in this report.

THEODORE ANTONELLI
Major General, USA (Ret)
Washington, D.C.
March 1979

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

DEFENSE AGENCY REVIEW

↘ This report responds to the request to conduct an exploratory review of Defense Agencies with a view toward identifying organizational problems, if any, and developing options for further study. It is based on data furnished by the Agencies and more than 200 interviews with key Department of Defense (DoD) officials and other knowledgeable people. The findings and issues have been confirmed by field research. ↗

Over the last 20 years an evolutionary trend has resulted in major changes in the nature of the support/services system of the Armed Forces. These changes have derived from the need to improve efficiency, economy, and effectiveness and, in some instances, by the inability of the Services to agree on common procedures. Control over many aspects of strategic services, such as communications and intelligence and "wholesale" support, such as POL, food, and maps has been unified and centralized in Defense Agencies. The Services continue to provide tactical and "retail" support in these functional areas.

As the Agencies increased from two to twelve, their size, scope, and influence grew steadily. They

have over 80,000 civilian and 8,000 military personnel and operating budgets exceeding \$3 billion. In FY 78 they expended or directly controlled approximately \$15 billion - 50% of a Military Service budget - through their appropriations, revolving funds, and program management responsibilities. They also have extensive audit/oversight responsibilities over \$31 billion in defense contracts and Foreign Military Sales trust funds.

A wide variety of other support and service organizations have proliferated in DoD. In addition to six OSD Field Activities and two organizations reporting through the JCS, we have identified 71 Single Manager, 140 Executive Agent, 103 Lead Service, and 145 Delegation of Authority assignments. The funding of activities covered by these assignments is contained within Service and other budgets. This trend toward unified support and services continues. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recently assigned responsibility for mobilization deployment planning to the US Readiness Command. Recommendations are being considered in DoD for consolidation of audio-visual, command/control, and postal functions and for expansion of the Defense Logistic Agency's (DLA) mission to include management of all consumable items. Studies are planned or in progress to address centralization of the transportation/

traffic management, commissary, audit, and investigative functions. It is not clear whether the ultimate objective/ outcome of this trend will be a multiplicity of heterogeneous organizations covering the spectrum of support functions or a central support organization such as a fifth Uniformed Service.

The evaluation of this trend by the principal officials of the Department differs widely. Many view the continued expansion of the Agency concept as no longer desirable. They consider that small functional entities have proliferated to the extent that organizational complexity impedes efficient management. Some believe the intense inter-service competition of the 1960's has matured and that many functions should be returned to the Services. Many feel the span of control of high OSD staff officials, who have among the most responsible and demanding tasks in the Nation, inhibits effective oversight of this complex of organizations. Some also believe there is an upper limit to effectiveness and efficiency which may be derived from consolidation.

Others hold that the current organization is adequate to meet the needs of the Department. They feel that the Services are still unable to accomplish unified support/service missions efficiently. They also believe that the importance of such functions

requires management independence and doubt they would be adequately funded if returned to the Services.

The lack of a clearly defined organizational objective coupled with the wide difference of opinion concerning the effectiveness of the existing organization has led us to conclude that the central issue for further study is: What is the optimal future organization for support and services of the Armed Forces?

The implications of the evolutionary changes which have taken place or are under consideration need to be better understood. Adequate and responsive support and services are essential to the existence and capabilities of the combat forces. We have identified six other issues which cut across all or most of the Agencies' functions:

- o The amount of efficiency and economy which has acutally been achieved,
- o The capability of the existing system to support the combat forces in crises or war,
- o The effectiveness and accountability of the Agencies' chain of command,
- o The adequacy of the planning, programming and budgeting procedures for the Agencies,
- o The effectiveness of programs to develop and manage specialist personnel, and

o The division of authority and responsibility among the Agencies, OSD, the Services, and the JCS. The major findings under each of these issues is as follows:

o Efficiency, economy, and effectiveness (E³).

Since the statutory basis for the formation of Defense Agencies is the achievement of E³, we attempted to validate Agency accomplishments in this area. Changes in missions and functions over time coupled with lack of objective measures of output make comparisons and evaluation of performance improvements difficult to substantiate. The fundamental nature of this problem, also noted in the Rice Report, suggests that it should be pursued in any follow-on study of Defense Agencies.

o Wartime and Crisis Capabilities

We found some shortcomings in the readiness and responsiveness of the Agencies that support the operating forces in crisis or war. There does appear to be greater emphasis on peacetime economy and efficiency among the Agencies than concern for wartime effectiveness. The problems can be grouped into five interrelated areas: planning for contingencies; conduct of tests and exercises; vulnerabilities in war or crisis; priority given to support between Washington and the field commands; and coordination between the agencies and other elements of the Department. These

problems could perhaps be overcome by an increased emphasis on preparedness.

- o Responsibility for Oversight of Defense Agencies.

We found that ambiguities exist in the oversight and supervision of most Agencies. One major cause lies in the multiple sources of direction and guidance to which an Agency is subject. For example, five DoD and two non-DoD organizations have been assigned official responsibility for providing policy direction to DIA. Responsibility for providing guidance in other functional areas is similarly divided among a variety of organizations. In some cases, Agencies receive little or no oversight due to the span of control and the number and importance of other problems faced by top DoD officials which leave them little time for supervising the activities of the Agency reporting to them.

- o Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)

Agency programs are not subject to the same scrutiny as those of the Services, and the policy guidance provided them could be more explicit. The evidence is persuasive that the participation of the Agencies in the policy planning and program phases is minimal. More definitive broad policy planning guidance is needed to set objectives which the Agencies should be capable of attaining.

o Development and management of specialist personnel.

The Defense Agencies perform service and support functions which are specialized in nature. We have found that assigned personnel are highly skilled and dedicated. The potential problem lies in the fact that, once a function has been transferred to an Agency, the Services are no longer motivated to recruit and train specialists in these fields. This will eventually result in depletion of existing assets. Some skill areas affected include mapping, charting, cryptology, languages, and nuclear weapons design and effects.

o Responsibility, authority, and coordination with the Services, JCS, and Unified and Specified Commands.

Creation of the Agency structure has complicated an already complex set of relationships among the OSD, JCS, Services, U & S Commands. The basic difficulty, reflected in the Steadman Report, lies in the division between mission responsibility and resource allocation authority. We have not been able to examine this very broad issue in the comprehensive manner which it deserves. However, we found evidence of a number of specific problems which is sufficiently persuasive to be convincing as to their validity. These problems include:

- o Authority to levy requirements without commensurate responsibility,
- o Authority for quality inspection without responsibility for utilization,
- o Reductions in efficiency resulting from inadequate coordination, and
- o Lack of participation by U & S Commanders in review of Agency budgets.

CONCLUSIONS.

We conclude that the Defense Agencies are well managed organizations, especially when considering the size, scope, and complexity of their activities. Their managers are talented and their personnel are highly motivated and dedicated. The inadequacies found are related to the incremental development of organizational problems over an extended span of time and not to any of the Department's personnel. However, in any large organization improvements are possible in management of scarce resources, and in the Defense Department even modest improvements have the potential for effecting resource economies of large scale.

There is a need for a deliberate and systematic examination of the central issue found by this exploratory review: to determine the optimal future

organization for support and services of the Armed Forces. It would permit the Secretary, the President, and the Congress, as appropriate, to consider a full range of choices and decide the future direction for the organization of the Department.

This examination and subsequent implementation of its findings may require a lengthy period. Therefore, we also considered possible near term improvements to the existing system of support and services. Within the foregoing context we concluded that there is a need to:

- o Improve the responsiveness and readiness for crisis and war of the Defense Agencies
- o Improve the PPBS system of the Department for the Defense Agencies
- o Review the current system of personnel management, training and education of specialists in the Department, and
- o Insure adequate coordination between the Defense Agencies and the other elements of the Department.

It is therefore recommended that the Secretary of Defense:

- o Direct a comprehensive study to determine the optimal future organization for support and services of the Armed Forces in the context of the six cross-cutting issues described.

- o Direct the implementation of near term measures to improve the responsiveness and readiness of the Defense Agencies providing support and services to the operating forces.

- o Direct the Under Secretary for Policy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation (ASD, PA&E), and the Chairman, JCS to take actions to improve the PPBS system for Agency programs and budgets.

- o Direct the ASD Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics to review the Service and Agency requirements for and availability of specialists in order to identify gaps and initiate appropriate corrective actions.

- o Direct the Chairman, JCS, the OSD, the Services, and the Directors of Defense Agencies to implement measures to improve coordination.

DEFENSE AGENCY REVIEW

ORIGIN OF THE REPORT

In September 1977, the President sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense transmitting three issue papers on Defense reorganization. The President requested a "searching organizational review based on these summaries....so as to produce an unconstrained examination of alternative reforms in organization, management, and decision processes in the Department of Defense." Accordingly, the Secretary commissioned three studies of the topics of these issue papers: Headquarters Management, the National Military Command Structure, and Resource Management.

The Defense Resource Management issue paper summarized the problems and opportunities in that area as follows:

The Department of Defense now spends approximately \$36 billion or about 30 to 35 percent of its budget on support services and functions--supply, maintenance, training, health care delivery, base operations and the like. There is much evidence that these functions are more expensive and less effective than they might be.

In April 1978, a letter from the Office of Management and Budget to the Director of the Resource Management Study indicated areas that a "....comprehensive DoD resource study should address." Attached to that letter was an issue paper on Defense Agencies which

stated:

In FY 78, Defense Agencies are directly accountable for over 2 billion dollars or 1.9 percent of the defense budget. Their impact on the total DoD far exceeds this dollar amount.

In September 1978 a review of Defense Agencies was initiated to complement the three original Defense organization studies. It was envisioned that the project would encompass, as a minimum, a review of the roles, functions, and responsibilities of the various Defense Agencies. In accordance with the Study Directive (Appendix A), the first phase has been an exploratory review which examined various options for approaches to further study.

In consonance with this directive, the focus of this study effort has been on the various broad functions of support and services for the Armed Forces and the roles of the Agencies in performing these functions.

EVOLUTION OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

P.L. 85-599, the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, contains an amendment sponsored by Congressmen John McCormack of Massachusetts and Thomas Curtis of Missouri which reads:

Whenever the Secretary of Defense determines it will be advantageous to the Government in terms of effectiveness, economy or efficiency, he shall provide for the carrying out of any

supply or service activity common to more than one military department by a single agency or such other organizational entities as he deems appropriate.

The legislative history of the bill reveals something of the intent of the co-sponsors.

Mr. McCormack: It will be recalled that General Eisenhower, in September 1952, in a speech at Baltimore protested at great length at the expense and extravagance that has been built into the three departments contrary to the express promises to the Congress....the reorganization bill which he sent to the Congress fails to take into consideration the supply and service activities. These activities include procurement, warehousing, distribution, cataloging, and other supply activities, surplus disposal, financial management, budgeting, disbursing, accounting, and so forth, medical and hospital services, transportation - land, sea, air - intelligence, legal public relations, recruiting, military police, training, liaison activities, and so forth, and use an estimated 66 2/3 percent of the military budget.

In 1962, after the establishment of several of the Defense Agencies, a special subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, chaired by Congressman Porter Hardy, Jr., expressed the view that there had been vastly increased centralization of decisionmaking, directly or indirectly, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as a result, diminution of the responsibilities of the military departments and the separate

services. Concern was expressed as to what this increased centralization of decisionmaking in the Office of the Secretary of Defense would eventually produce with regard to the organization of our military forces for national security. Since 1962, the Congress has conducted no further inquiries specifically on the Defense Agencies other than the annual authorizations and appropriations hearings.


THE DEFENSE AGENCIES TODAY

Over the last 20 years an evolutionary trend has resulted in major change in the nature of the support/services system of the Armed Forces. Control of many aspects of strategic services, such as communications and intelligence, and "wholesale" support, such as POL, food and maps, has been unified in Defense Agencies. The Services continue to provide most tactical and "retail" services and support in these functional areas. This trend has been promoted by the expectation of improved economy, effectiveness, and efficiency in the Defense Department and the inability of the Military Services to agree on common procedures.

Twelve Agencies exist in the Department today. This review has considered eleven. The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA), which is expected to be

transferred from the Department by Presidential order, was excluded. The Agencies are shown in Table 1, in the order in which they gained official Defense Agency status.

**TABLE 1
TOTAL DEFENSE AGENCIES**




1 DNA had its origin in the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) founded in 1946.

2 DARPA was started as ARPA in 1958.


DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DAS	Defense Audit Service
DCA	Defense Communication Agency
DCAA	Defense Contract Audit Agency
DCPA	Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIS	Defense Investigative Service
DIA	Defense Logistics Agency
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
NSA	National Security Agency

As the Agencies increased from two to twelve, their size, scope and policy influence grew steadily. The eleven Agencies under consideration have over 80 thousand civilian and eight thousand military personnel and operating budgets exceeding \$3 billion. In FY 78 they expended or directly controlled approximately \$15 billion--50% of a Military Service budget--through their appropriations, revolving funds, and program management responsibilities.

Table 2 shows the steady increase in the funds which are managed/controlled/directed by the Agencies during the past twenty years. The decrease from FY 75 to 78 is consistent with the reduction of the total defense budget in that period.




The growth in the number and size of the Defense Agencies is also reflected in the number of personnel assigned to them as shown in Table 3. This quantum increase in resources controlled by the Agencies is indicative of an accompanying increase in their responsibilities and their influence over defense policy and programs. Considerable as it is, however, it does not in itself fully portray the magnitude of their responsibility and influence. The Agencies also have extensive audit/oversight responsibilities over \$31 billion in defense contracts and \$9 billion in trust funds. This growth trend in the scope and influence of Defense Agencies is merely a fact and should not be considered as a value judgment, either favorable or unfavorable. However, it is clear that the Defense Agencies as a group should be a matter



of considerable significance to DoD top management. They are no longer the relatively minor organizations in the DoD that they once were considered.

The development of Defense Agencies appears to be accompanied by a trend toward civilianization of their personnel. A probable cause is that civilian personnel manning is generally considered to be more economical than military. The percentage of civilian manpower in the Defense Agencies in contrast to the DoD-wide total percentage is shown in Table 4 for the period from 1962 to the present.

The trend toward unified support and services is continuing.



Recommendations are being considered in DoD for consolidation of audio-visual, command/control, and postal functions and for expansion of DLA supply management to all consumable items. Studies are planned or in progress to address centralization of the transportation/traffic management, commissary, audit, and investigative functions. The JCS have assigned the responsibility for mobilization deployment planning to United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM). It is not clear whether the ultimate result of this trend will be a multiplicity of heterogeneous organizations covering the spectrum of support or a central support organization, such as a fifth Uniformed Service.

OTHER COMMON SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS.

A wide variety of other common support and service organizations have proliferated in DoD. These organizations represent both alternative models to Defense Agencies and, in certain cases, supplements to the Defense Agency system. They include assignments of Services as Single Managers, Executive Agents, and Lead Services; Delegations of Authority to Services; DoD Field Activities; and organizations reporting to the JCS. We were unable to locate a central repository of these responsibilities or official definitions of these terms. They are often used interchangeably, and the documentation for each

specifies the responsibilities and authority. The Military Departments have provided listings of their assignments--which in some cases required several months to prepare--which we have consolidated at Appendix B. We have found 86 assignments of Services as Single Managers to include such critical functions as Conventional Ammunition (Army), Ocean Transportation (Navy), and Airlift Service (Air Force). There are 143 assignments of Services as Executive Agents, such as the Armed Forces Courier Service (Army), the DoD Computer Institute (Navy), and the Security Assistance Accounting Center (Air Force). The 103 assignments as Lead Services include the Tactical Shelter Program (Army), Electro-Magnetic Countermeasure Specifications and Standards (Navy), and Aerospace Systems Intelligence (Air Force). There are 150 delegations of authority which include Chemical Agents and Munitions (Army), the Automatic Text Message Handling System (Navy), and DoD Manager for Manned Space Flight Operations (Air Force).

The six OSD Field Activities are:

Washington Headquarters Services
American Forces Information Service
DoD Dependent Schools
Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS)

Tri-Service Medical Information System
(TRIMIS)
Office of Economic Adjustment

Some joint support and service organizations report to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS. For example, the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff (JSTPS) at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska develops and maintains the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and its associated target list. The Military Airlift Command (MAC) is a Specified Command.

This proliferation of the number and variety of support and service organizations has had the advantage of eliminating some duplicating support and service organizations in the Military Departments. On the other hand, the sheer complexity of the organization complicates management. For example, the PPBS is the Department's principal management tool. Yet in making broad budget allocations for the Departments it is very difficult for top management to know what portions of the allocations are for support and service activities as opposed to directly combat-related missions. The funding of all these activities

is contained within Service and other budgets. Maintenance of a central file of up-to-date listings of assignments of these types on an ongoing basis would appear to be desirable.

COMMON SUPPORT AND SERVICES NOT INTEGRATED

Many common support and service functions of the DoD have not been consolidated and remain the responsibility of the separate Services. These include such major functions as transportation, health and medical care, construction, and the chaplaincy. The transportation function was selected for review here as an example of such an unconsolidated activity. Resources precluded consideration of more than one unconsolidated functional area.

TRANSPORTATION

Problems in the transportation area were cited by the 'Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report in 1970, which recommended assigning the Transportation Operating Agencies (TOAs) to an umbrella "Logistics Command." The recently completed report on the National Military Command Structure raised the possibility of establishing a "Unified Transportation Command," but the approach was rejected by the study for lack of any clearly

defined benefits. The House Appropriations Committee is currently planning to hold hearings on a proposal to consolidate two of the TOAs.

The transportation functions of a strategic and "wholesale" nature are assigned to the three Service Secretaries, each having responsibility for particular functions under the single manager concept.

The Army's Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) provides traffic management service in CONUS [other than that provided by MAC and Military Sealift Command (MSC)] and operates ocean terminals. MTMC is a jointly staffed major command of the Army. The Commander, MTMC, is under the operational control of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installations, Logistics and Financial Management (IL&FM). However, for resource matters, he reports to the Chief of Staff, Army. In addition to traffic management in CONUS and operation of designated ocean terminals worldwide, MTMC contracts for common user ocean terminal services and manages the movement of personal property traffic worldwide.

The Air Force's MAC is both a Specified Command and a TOA. In his role as a specified commander, CINCMAC reports to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS. In his role as a TOA, the Commander of MAC reports to the Secretary of the Air Force through the Air Staff.

MAC operates common user military airlift aircraft and contracts for commercial capability to augment the organic fleet. MAC also provides global weather, search and rescue, and audio-visual services to the Air Force.

The Navy's MSC is the transportation operating agency for common user sealift. MSC's Commander reports to the Secretary of the Navy through the Chief of Naval Operations. MSC operates the nucleus fleet of cargo ships and tankers, charters commercial vessels to supplement the nucleus fleet, and contracts for space on commercial ships. It also operates fleet support ships and special mission ships.

Our brief analysis concluded that the disadvantages of consolidating these three transportation functions appeared to outweigh the advantages. On the other hand, a lesser option of centralized traffic management for the TOA's, advocated by some DoD officials, did seem to have the potential for increased effectiveness and economy. The Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics (MRA&L) is planning a study of the transportation function, and we believe that this option should be considered in greater depth in that effort.

ISSUES

Since the first Defense Agencies were created, the world has become increasingly complex. Shifts in the world power structure have given the United States less capability to control events which influence its security and well-being. The Soviet Union has undertaken a long term military buildup which continues. At the same time, this country is faced with mounting economic and energy problems and multiple pressures for reduction of inflation, government expenditures, and taxes. A tension is always present between desires for reduced defense expenditures and for increased security. At a minimum, this environment can be expected to require assurance that every avenue for increasing DoD effectiveness, economy, and efficiency is explored.

The evaluation of the trend toward unification of central support and services by the principal officials of the Department differs widely. Many view the continued expansion of the Agency concept as no longer desirable. They consider that small functional entities have proliferated to the extent that organizational complexity impedes efficient management. Some believe the intense inter-service competition of the 1960s has matured and many functions should be returned to the

Services. Many feel the span of control of high OSD staff officials, who have among the most responsible and demanding tasks in the Nation, inhibits effective oversight of this complex of organizations. Some also believe there is an upper limit to the effectiveness and efficiency which may be derived from consolidation.

Others hold that the current organization is adequate to meet the needs of the Department. The unified support and service base of the Department has, in their view, enhanced efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. They feel the Services are still unable to accomplish unified support/service missions efficiently. They also believe that the importance of such functions requires management independence and doubt their adequate funding if returned to the Services.

Our analysis of these opinions has identified one central and six significant cross-cutting issues. The central issue can be stated as follows: "What is the optimal future organization for support and services of the Armed Forces?" The six cross-cutting issues are:

- o The amount of efficiency and economy which has actually been achieved,
- o The capability of the existing system to support the fighting forces in crisis or wartime,

- o the effectiveness and accountability of the chain of command for the Agencies,
- o The adequacy of their PPBS procedures,
- o The programs for development and management of specialist personnel, and
- o The division of authority and responsibility among the Agencies, the Services, OSD, and the JCS.

These issues appear to warrant the attention of the Secretary of Defense and possibly the President.

Although each Agency has different missions and methods of operation, we have found that various Agencies are related in the types of functions which they discharge. These can be roughly grouped into the following categories:

- o Support of the operating forces. (DLA, DIA, DCA, DMA, and NSA)
- o Staff support. (DSAA, DARPA, DNA)
- o Audit and investigation. (DAS, DIS, and DCAA)

This classification is useful in considering the various issue areas. The following briefly describes each issue area.

CENTRAL ISSUE: THE FUTURE DoD ORGANIZING CONCEPT

ISSUE: WHAT IS THE OPTIMAL FUTURE ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT AND SERVICES OF THE ARMED FORCES TO ACHIEVE DoD GOALS?

We believe that the implications of the trend which has changed the system for support and services of the Armed Forces need to be better understood. Many treat the support and services of the Armed Forces as much less important than the combatant forces. Yet, many historians feel that American military successes in the past century have been largely attributable to the support provided by American industrial superiority. While it is true that the combat forces on land, sea, and air are the cutting edge of the Armed Forces team, adequate and responsive support and services are essential to their existence. The capabilities of our combat forces would be greatly limited by inadequate support systems and are expanded by more capable ones. This is particularly true with today's reliance on technologically sophisticated weapons. The support system is also important in that it consumes a significant part of the Department's resources. The Rice Report observed that over one-third of the Defense budget and

manpower is employed in the delivery of logistics support.^{1/} It is, therefore, essential that the management of the Department from the military commanders and staffs in the field to its top management in Washington understand the system fully.

There is a need to understand the implications of organizational change in the support system, not only to advance the Department's goals of efficiency and effectiveness but also to be able to control the trend to the extent possible. Differing views exist among experts in public administration as to the extent to which decisionmakers can or should attempt to plan for and control the achievement of future goals over time.^{2/} In fact, DoD's multiple goals of maximizing peacetime efficiency and economy while assuring the Nation's security in an uncertain future are sometimes in conflict. Whatever theory of long-term planning one may hold, it is essential to determine objectives. As a minimum, periodic analysis of trends and alternative objectives provides a framework for short-term decisionmaking which can assure that incremental changes are directed toward these goals. Unwanted outcomes of long-term incremental

^{1/} Donald B. Rice, Defense Resource Management Study, February 1979, p 43.

^{2/} See, for example, Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review, Spring 1959 and The Policy Making Process, Prentice-Hall, 1968 and James R. Schlesinger, "Organizational Structures and Planning," Issues in Defense Economics, Columbia University Press, 1967.

change may thus often be prevented. Moreover, decision-makers can often influence the trend of change toward the goals they favor, even if they may not be able to control them fully.

The possible outcomes of the trend of consolidation and centralization in the system of support and services in DoD, such as a fifth Uniformed Service, have significant implications. Shortcomings exist in the present organization which are described under the six cross-cutting issues. Therefore, we believe that the optimal future organization for support and services of the Armed Forces is the central issue for future study. It needs deliberate and systematic consideration. It is important to determine whether more effective and efficient support and services in DoD can be achieved in the future by increasing the scope and number of Defense Agencies or through alternative organizational models.

Some may believe that the sensitivity of the issue of unification of elements of the Military Services could make public discussion undesirable. We believe that radical change in institutions of such importance to the existence of the Nation is undesirable. Change by evolution is preferable. However, the direction of future evolution needs to be carefully considered. The

extent that the prescription for the future is convincing to all concerned will also determine the amount of bureaucratic infighting and wheel-spinning attendant to its realization. Moreover, we have found indications that among the military professionals today there appears to be greater acceptance of the Defense Agency concept than there was twenty years ago.

We believe that a comprehensive review of this problem is required and should include:

- o Examination of the six cross-cutting issues delineated here and others that may emerge.
- o Evaluation of a full range of alternative organizational models, to include establishment of a DoD Department of Support and Services, return of Agency functions to the existing Departments, and development of criteria for the creation of various organizational forms.
- o Review in greater depth of the Agencies providing support and service to the operating forces and several functional areas not now integrated, e.g., transportation, construction, or health care, if appropriate.

Such a study should evaluate the historical performance of the various existing organizational models, such as Single Managers, Executive Agents, and Joint

Commands. It should consider the experiences of other nations as well as our own in the integration of support and services, e.g.,

- o the British Ministry of Supply in World War II,
- o the Canadian unification of the Armed Forces,
- o the U.S. Army Service Forces in World War II,
- o the approaches of the USSR, our NATO allies, and other contemporary models.

It should include greater in-depth study than was possible here of the performance of the Defense Agencies in various crises. We believe that a study of this type can provide a better understanding of the features of the most appropriate future organizing concept for support and services which can then be approached at an appropriate pace.

Our belief that determination of the optimal future organizing concept for support and services is the central issue of this review derives from the fact that it is raised and supported by each of the six organizational issues which we have found cut across all or most of the functional areas of the Defense Agencies. These issues are themselves interrelated, and our findings in regard to each are described next. No priority should be inferred from the order of presentation.

Efficiency and Economy of Defense Agencies.

ISSUE - WHAT IMPROVEMENTS IN EFFICIENCY, ECONOMY, AND/OR EFFECTIVENESS HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED BY THE DEFENSE AGENCIES?

Since the statutory basis of the formation of Defense Agencies is the achievement of improvements in efficiency, economy, and effectiveness (E^3), a determination of their accomplishments in these areas is essential in evaluating this organizational mode. In approaching this issue an assessment was provided by the Agencies of their E^3 gains using their own criteria.

The Agencies believe that they have increased their E^3 since their formation. Various reasons are given, such as that consolidation of similar activities has resulted in productivity and efficiency gains and that scarce talents concentrated in one organization make their capabilities available to all DoD users. This is especially true, they believe, with respect to expertise that is long in development and difficult to locate. Further, the Agencies contend that they preserve institutional knowledge and prevent overlap and duplication of efforts. Agencies involved in system design have also promoted standardization and

interoperability of equipment which facilitates joint operations. Moreover, they have reduced the number of types of common items as well as competitive bidding by the Military Departments for the same equipment or services.

We have found differing views in regard to Agency E³. It is held by many that some Agencies involved in procurement have not met necessary standards of quality. An example cited was the excessive number of unacceptable "line-stoppers"--rejected items which stop or delay production lines--and extensive and costly litigation with contractors. Some also believe that lack of effective support by some Agencies has led to reestablishment in the Services of certain functions originally transferred to the Agencies. Such duplication of effort is uneconomical.

Analysis of the Agencies' responses regarding their improvements in E³ by an independent analytical group found that, in most cases, the amount of improvement was not quantifiable from their effectiveness measures. In many cases, E³ improvement was reported merely on the basis of the centralization of management and consolidation of functions resulting from the

existence of the Agency. Assertions of E³ without any quantitative measures do not provide an adequate basis for evaluation of Agency performance. We recognize that the quantitative assessment of such improvements over time is extremely difficult and complex. The selection of appropriate criteria which can be used to measure Agency effectiveness is central to the problem. This view is consistent with that of the Rice Report, which stated that the absence of objective performance standards is at the heart of the lack of an explicit measurement system for tracking the progress of DoD programs.^{3/}

Fundamental to the dilemma of how to appraise the Agencies' performance are the imprecise and varying definitions of the terms efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. This is not a new problem. It lies at the core of the study of economics. Private industry in the United States employs the organization's profit or loss as its basic performance measure. However, government management is hampered by the difficulty of quantifying the output of the products it provides its citizens--national security in the case of the DoD.

^{3/} Donald B. Rice, Defense Resource Management Study, February 1979, p 9.

Additional dimensions of complexity are added in attempting to compare organizational performance. As an example, DLA forthrightly stated, "Realistically, if the Military Services had not transferred missions and functions to DLA, it is probable that they also would have achieved savings through management improvements." Comparisons of statistical measures of performance of similar functions are not always valid because, in at least some cases, the Agencies are funded to meet higher levels of performance than are the Services. A further difficulty in comparisons over time results from changes in missions and technology.

We believe that some of the Agencies have made a prima facie case as to their E³ improvements. In any case, we do not have reason to believe that they have not made such improvements. Moreover, we have found numerous instances of outstanding work by the Agencies in the course of this review. On the other hand, whether the Department is getting the degree of efficiency that it can or ought to expect is another matter. In this regard, we note that the ambiguity of the Agencies' chain of command discussed later may not provide the intensive management which can raise the sights of the Agencies.

Effectiveness must relate to the purpose of the organization. In the Defense Department this translates into maintaining the security of the Nation by prevention or deterrence of war and, should this fail, through achieving the national objectives and defending the country in war. This latter subject is treated subsequently as a separate issue.

The independent analysts who examined the Agencies' submissions have recommended some approaches to determining each Agency's E³ more explicitly. They also suggested examining methodologies used by the Government Accounting Office and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. While the success of this effort would not be certain, we consider that the fundamental nature of the problem to any follow-on study of the Defense Agencies--as well as to program review in the entire DoD, as the Rice Study indicates--suggests the desirability of pursuing it further. Pending any progress in such lines, we believe that the best method of enhancing E³ is through the competition inherent in the DoD PPB system. Its application to the Agencies is also at issue and is discussed separately.

There does not appear to be a need for any change to the legislation regarding the formation of Agencies

based on E³. The goals of maximizing peacetime efficiency and economy while assuring combat effectiveness are basic national goals which have remained constant--even though they are sometimes in conflict. The intent of the Congress in the 1958 Amendment to the National Security Act was clearly to give the Secretary of Defense the responsibility and the authority to achieve them. The statute thus leaves the definition of the terms to the discretion of the Secretary.

Wartime and Crisis Capabilities

ISSUE - DO THE DEFENSE AGENCIES WHICH PROVIDE SUPPORT AND SERVICES TO THE COMBATANT FORCES HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO ASSURE THE READINESS AND RESPONSIVENESS NEEDED IN CRISIS OR WARTIME SITUATIONS?

The formation of Defense Agencies to provide support and services appears to have been accompanied by a trend toward civilianization of their personnel and management. This trend is a matter of serious concern to many of the officials of the Department, especially, but not exclusively, among the military. They believe that in their drive for efficiency and economy, the Agencies have assumed too much of a peacetime orientation

and may have sacrificed their wartime effectiveness. Concern is also expressed in regard to the future leadership of the Agencies. Civilian direction of the Agencies is perceived to be evolving, which could make them more vulnerable to politicization. Such a situation is seen as having contributed to the types of problems which have beset the General Services Administration.

This body of opinion seriously questions whether the Agencies would be sufficiently responsive in crisis or wartime, whether they have an appreciation of operational military needs, whether their mechanisms can adjust priorities adequately, and whether their relationships with the JCS and the Unified Commanders can assure the optimum utilization of their support and services.

On the other hand, it is generally believed that civilianization is more economical, and many senior officials contend that the use of military personnel is not essential, even in crisis or wartime, for functions which are not directly combat-related. They view responsiveness in crisis as dependent on people and not organizations. Further, it is argued that Agencies such as DLA and DCA acquitted themselves well during the Vietnam conflict.

We have conducted a careful survey of this issue, both in Washington and in the Unified and Specified Commands in the field who are the customers of the Defense Agencies. We find that the concerns expressed about the responsiveness of the Agencies in war and crisis are appropriate. We have found some shortcomings in the readiness and responsiveness of the present system for support of the operating forces in the event of war or crisis. While some are potentially serious, it would not be correct to infer that the Armed Forces could not be adequately supported. In such stressful situations it is possible for dedicated people to surmount organizational inadequacies to some degree. And we found dedicated people, military and civilian, in high and low positions, wherever we have visited.

The issue appears mainly to be one of emphasis on peacetime efficiency as opposed to wartime effectiveness. We recognize that trade-offs are always necessary in the DoD between these two goals. Thus, whether or not the optimal balance has been attained is a subjective judgment at best. Indeed, the only real test is the ultimate one of actual war or crisis. Moreover, we cannot state with assurance that these shortcomings are caused by the Defense Agency system.

They do exist and an organizational connection is possible. This issue applies mainly to the Agencies which support the combatant forces, such as DIA, DLA, DCA, DMA, and NSA, and only indirectly to those primarily engaged in staff support such as DNA, DIS, and DSAA.

The areas in which improvements in readiness and responsiveness of the support system appear needed can be grouped into five general interrelated areas. These are: planning for contingencies, conduct of tests and exercises, vulnerabilities in war or crisis, the priority of support given to Washington and the field commands, and coordination between the operating forces and the supporting agencies. These problems may perhaps be overcome by an increase in emphasis on preparedness.

There appears to be little systematic linkage between the contingency planning of the JCS and many of the Agencies supporting the operating forces. In fact, in some instances, we can find little evidence of up-to-date Agency planning for contingencies. Base support operations do not always require the detailed planning or the frequent updating that the combat forces require.

Nevertheless, an appropriate level of contingency planning should be required of all organizations supporting the combat forces. The transition from peace to war is always difficult and can be eased by contingency planning, even though the contingencies seldom arise in exactly the way they are assumed.

Operational and readiness tests and exercises are important for pointing out deficiencies that may exist in the system as well as for training those who may be entrusted with important crisis and wartime responsibilities. Therefore, we believe that the Agencies supporting the operating forces should conduct more such tests and exercises. These Agencies usually participate in JCS exercises, but their participation must be regarded as minimal, especially when compared to that of Service staffs and military commands. Exercise scenarios and the kinds of problems which are developed by exercise planners at all levels should provide greater participation for these Agencies. Given their increased role in the support of the combat forces it would seem prudent to take advantage of the opportunities for training and understanding of the problems of war and crisis.

Dependence on various peacetime modes of operation may create wartime or crisis vulnerabilities. These modes of operation may be the most efficient and effective in peacetime. They may also be effective in crisis or limited war, but higher levels of intensity of warfare may lead to their loss. Prudence dictates flexibility in preparations for possible loss, rather than total reliance upon them. Arrangements should be made either to keep or replace key civilian personnel in potential combat zones. Preparations should be made for alternatives to equipment and systems whose use is susceptible to denial in wartime or crisis by enemy or other nations. There will never be an absence of vulnerabilities. Many are due to resource constraints or changes in the threat, rather than organization. Mechanisms should be developed to ensure that top managers are aware of such potential vulnerabilities in the areas of responsibility of the appropriate Agencies.

While centralized support and services can provide many advantages, a potential disadvantage always lies in their not unnatural propensity to set their priorities based on the perspective of the Washington Headquarters. In some areas a competition for timeliness or adequacy

of support exists between Washington Headquarters and the field commands. It is not possible to foresee the priorities which a particular situation may dictate. The need is for both flexibility and an understanding of the problems of the field commands.

There is also a need for continuing coordination between the operating forces and the support Agencies. When General Jones became Chairman, JCS he invited key Agency directors to his staff meetings. This is a constructive step which should preclude lack of knowledge or understanding by the Agency directors of the broad operational situation and military planning.

The Steadman Report indicated the importance of improving readiness reporting for the combat forces.^{4/} In this regard we found that this problem applies to the Agencies as well. A system of readiness reporting by the Agencies which support the combat forces could enhance the understanding of their preparedness to support operations in war or crisis by the leadership of the Department.

^{4/} Richard C. Steadman, Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National Military Command Structure, July 1978, p. 39.

Responsibility for Oversight of Defense Agencies.

ISSUE - DO THE DEFENSE AGENCIES HAVE A DEGREE OF AUTONOMY WHICH COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO THE OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES OF THE DEPARTMENT, OR DO THEIR FUNCTIONAL IMPORTANCE AND SPECIALIZED NATURE REQUIRE MANAGEMENT INDEPENDENCE TO ASSURE THEIR MOST EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION?

Since 1958, most Defense Agencies have reported directly to the Secretary of Defense. Some providing support or services to the combatant forces reported to him through the JCS or, in the case of the DIA, have had a dual command line to the Secretary and the JCS. When Secretary Brown took office, he decided--correctly, we believe--to reduce his personal span of control. The responsibility for oversight of the Agencies was assigned to the Under Secretaries and various Assistant Secretaries. The relationships of the Agencies with the JCS were also changed to remove the Chiefs from the Agencies' chain of command, substituting "operational guidance" and other arrangements related to military operations. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has never had, and does not now have, a formal relationship with the JCS. The invitation by the CJCS of the Director of DLA and others to attend his

weekly staff meetings informally enhances the coordination of their activities with JCS operational planning and direction of the combatant forces.

We have found considerable differences of opinion in regard to the effectiveness of the current command arrangements for the Agencies. Many believe that they enjoy a large degree of autonomy which can be counter-productive to the objectives and policies of the Department. The critics pose the question: "Who's in charge?" and point to the overload on the Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries, who, like the Secretary himself, have broad and demanding responsibilities for policy that do not permit them to devote much time to the supervision of a Defense Agency. They note that, as a result, oversight, policy, program, and budget direction of the various Agencies devolves in practice on various subordinate staff officers of the busy Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries.

It is argued that the responsibility and resources of many of the currently designated overseers of the Agencies appear unbalanced. Various busy Assistant Secretaries have been assigned responsibility for all an Agency does or fails to do. Yet they do not have the time or staff to oversee actively all aspects of Agency performance.

Compounding the problem is the fact that guidance and direction in many facets of the Agency's activities emanate from other DoD staff divisions. Further complicating it is the fact that the Agencies, perceiving this ambiguity, frequently seek guidance from the DoD staff officials who are most likely to be sympathetic to the Agency's desires. This Catch-22 situation is said to dilute the authority of the cabinet and sub-cabinet officers charged with responsibility for the Agencies.

Proponents of the present command arrangements contend that the specialized functions of the Agencies and their importance to the overall national security effort require management independence to assure their most effective utilization. They advocate the selection of strong and highly competent managers as Agency Directors who, they maintain, will compensate for any ambiguity of command arrangements. This school of thought believes that a "management by exception" policy is effective for the Defense Agencies, especially since the activities of the Agencies generally tend to be routine and administrative in nature. They also observe that the functions of certain Agencies, such as DARPA and DCA are so closely related to their OSD counterparts that there is no ambiguity as to "Who's in charge?". It is also said by many that the achievements of the

Agencies are in fact attributable to their semi-autonomy.

Our study supports the views of those who believe that there is ambiguity and diffusion in the oversight over, and accountability for, most Agencies. However, we also agree with those who believe in selecting strong managers for the Agencies. We agree in principle with the concept of "management by exception." However, even Agencies with strong managers require some oversight or balance for such semi-autonomy. Every organizational entity, however worthy its purposes, has its own interests, which it will advance if unchecked, and which may not necessarily further the interests of the larger whole of which it is a part. Human enterprises require some overwatching authority. Such authority tends to become more diffuse at very high levels. Both American business and government have accordingly adopted the principle of competition or "checks in balances" among major organizations to preclude over-concentration of power. This principle is described in The Federalist Papers as follows:

This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. ^{5/}

^{5/} The Federalist, No. 51, by Alexander Hamilton/James Madison.

We did not find a system of effective oversight or of checks and balances for Defense Agencies.

Another aspect of the ambiguity of authority over the Agencies lies in the multiple sources of direction and guidance to which they are subject. Although nominally under the authority of a sub-cabinet official designated in a DoD Directive, they receive guidance and directions from various elements of OSD, the JCS, and non-DoD organizations as well. For example, a review of nine DoD Directives pertaining to DIA revealed that responsibility for policy direction was assigned to five DoD and two non-DoD organizational entities. Responsibility for providing guidance in other functional areas is similarly assigned to greater or lesser numbers of specific organizations. This situation appears paradoxical to that of relative autonomy just described. It is--in the sense that the Agencies are given a very considerable amount of direction or guidance by these various staffs. However, they are given little management supervision or leadership, and, as their sufficiency of guidance is on occasion inconsistent or conflicting, an Agency is left to select which guidance it chooses, if any. This apparent paradox is created by a system of diffusion of authority and accountability which creates

risks of suboptimization. The dilution of oversight authority is not the fault of the DoD staff, but merely a reflection of its functional divisions and its wide and varied responsibilities. The result, however, is considered to be a situation of ambiguous accountability for Agency operations.

We do not believe anyone can be faulted or blamed for these inadequacies. They have simply grown incrementally in a huge Department over a twenty year period. However, it is now time to take steps to rectify the situation.

PPBS Procedures for Defense Agencies

ISSUE - DO THE PPBS PROCEDURES FOR DEFENSE AGENCIES PROVIDE ADEQUATE COMPETITION FOR SCARCE RESOURCES AND A RESULTING BALANCE BETWEEN AND WITHIN THE VARIOUS SUPPORT AND SERVICE AREAS IN THE DEPARTMENT, STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL, WHOLESALE AND RETAIL, AND WITH THE COMBATANT FORCES?

Defense Agencies receive their policy, strategy, programmatic and fiscal guidance from the same Consolidated

Guidance (CG) document used by the Services for the development of their Program Objective Memoranda (POM). Similarly, they use the POM Preparation Instruction for procedural and format uniformity in the submission of Agency POMs to OSD. While ASD Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) has the OSD oversight responsibility for the review of Defense Agency POMs, heavy reliance is placed on the individual review of the POMs by the following OSD staff offices:

<u>DEFENSE AGENCY POM</u>	<u>OSD OFFICE OF RESPONSIBILITY</u>
DIA	USD (P); ASD (C ³ I)
NSA	USD (P); ASD (C ³ I)
DMA	USD (R&E); ASD (C ³ I)
DNA	USD (R&E)
DARPA	USD (R&E)
DLA	ASD (MRA&L)
DCAA	ASD (MRA&L)
DAS	ASD (MRA&L); ASD (C)
DCA	ASD (C ³ I)
DIS	ASD (C)
DSAA	ASD (ISA)

We have found divergent opinions regarding the effectiveness of the PPBS procedures for the Defense Agencies. Many officials of the Department believe that, by virtue of their Agency status, the functions of the Agencies have assumed greater importance, and hence have been better funded, than those functions not in Agencies. Some feel that the CG and the POM Preparation Instructions are geared to the Services, not the Agencies and,

therefore, provide inadequate guidance to the Defense Agencies. Some hold that the high dollar value of Service POMs and the complex task of evaluating force structure issues saturates the capabilities of the OSD staff, thereby relegating the review of Agency POMs to a cursory analysis. Others contend that the heavy reliance on functional counterparts on the OSD staff for primary review of agency programs and budgets constitutes an inherent conflict of interest. In either event, these officials conclude that, since there are no adversary proceedings in the PPBS for the Agencies similar to those between PA&E and the Services, competition does not exist. Some believe that this contributes to the increase in the funding of the Agencies' budgets. The question is also posed as to whether a lack of balance results among the Department's functional programs, between their strategic and tactical, wholesale and retail components, and with the combatant forces they are designed to support.

On the other hand, supporters of the status quo argue that the importance of these specialized areas justifies their special PPBS procedures. They believe that, if these functions were returned to the Services, there is doubt that they would be adequately funded.

They maintain that the budget review conducted in the fall of each year provides an adequate analysis of the propriety and justification of Agency POMs. Further, this group notes, in regard to OSD staff functional counterparts passing judgment on Agency budgets, that the technical expertise necessary to understand the Agency programs is located in those staff sections. The proponents of this view point to data which shows the Agencies perform their functions in a highly effective manner. On the other hand, the critics contend that the Agencies' performance is at least in part a result of the better funding they receive from this system and that cost/effectiveness comparisons have never been made.

Our examination of this issue supports the validity of the view that there is a need for improving the participation of the Agencies in the PPB System. The Rice Report has made specific suggestions which could lead to major changes in the overall system. As noted earlier, since the DoD lacks the capability to define performance measures specifically, we believe that the PPB System is the best available means of managing shortages. Resources are always limited and constrained. The emphasis on Agency participation today is in the budget phase of the PPBS. However, the greatest value of the policy, planning, and programming phases lies in assuring that

the allocation of resources is optimized consistent with the objectives of the Department.

The evidence is persuasive that the participation of the Agencies in the policy, planning, and program phases is minimal. While some contend that the routine and administrative nature of the Agencies' activities does not lend itself to policy or program issues, we believe that the magnitude of the funding involved requires major issue scrutiny and that issues do exist. OMB and the Congress have raised such issues in the past.

We also found the same basic problem in the operation of the PPB System found by the Steadman, Ignatius, and Rice Reports--the desirability of more explicit broad policy planning guidance to set objectives our forces should be capable of attaining. The significance varies among the functional areas of the different Agencies. However, such guidance is necessary for Defense Agencies as well as the Military Services. As a minimum it could state general priorities among the geographical areas of the world and the various levels of intensity of potential conflicts, both as to likelihood of such conflict and the strategic significance to the national interest. Such policy guidance is valuable in assuring

the most rational allocation possible of resources for production of maps and charts, the design and distribution of communications systems, the construction of logistics and other facilities, and the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence.

Development and Management of Specialist Personnel

ISSUE - ARE THE PROGRAMS OF THE AGENCIES AND THE SERVICES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPECIALIZED SKILLS OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN CAREER FIELDS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES ADEQUATE TO MEET THE DEPARTMENT'S NEEDS FOR THESE SKILLS IN THE FUTURE?

One common characteristic of the Defense Agencies is that they perform service and support functions which are specialized in nature. Many officials of the Department consider that the consolidation of highly skilled specialist personnel in the Agencies has a synergistic effect on their utilization, training, and professional development. We have found that in general, they have highly skilled, dedicated, professional personnel who are important assets to national security. However, some senior Defense officials believe that the lack of enthusiasm of the Services, found by the Steadman Report, for furnishing top quality military personnel to the Joint

Staff is even more evident in the Defense Agencies. Others feel either that such is not the case or that it is not a problem.

Most of the Agencies with a large number of civilian specialists have developed education and training systems to maintain the skills needed to carry out their missions. However, concern is voiced by many high officials in regard to the future development of these skills in the Military Services once the existing store of talent is depleted. Specific skills mentioned as problem areas include logistics management, contract auditing, nuclear weapons design and effects, foreign language, cryptology, mapping and charting. Problems have also been cited in the management and development of civilian personnel in certain specialist fields, notably in the DIA, DIS, and DAS. The alleged problems suggest that the creation of Defense Agencies may require a DoD-wide review of the personnel management, education, and training of the specialist career fields involved by the Agencies and the Military Services. Such a review should proceed from wartime requirements for various special skills and the programs needed to develop them and then consider peacetime requirements.

The growth of the Defense Agencies has added an additional dimension to the problem of the division of scarce specialist personnel among the various Services and Agencies. This division limits the broad career development of these key specialists as well as their education and training. The consolidation of these specialized functions in the Agencies tends to reduce the Services' emphasis on their training and development. However, even when the function has been completely integrated into an Agency, the Military Services have a continuing need for some specialists, military and civilian, who can interpret the capabilities and limitations of the Agencies for the field commanders.

These problems of specialist personnel cannot necessarily be laid at the door of organization. Other factors exist, such as training lead time, personnel retention, and the inevitable problems of resource constraints. They are nevertheless complicated by the Agency system. For example, the centralized agencies seem to enjoy a priority for scarce personnel resources. Since there are, in many cases, dividing lines that restrict their broad career patterns, specialists in the Agencies are not always able to acquire an adequate appreciation of the needs of the operating forces, and vice versa. Another aspect is the continuing need for personnel with capabilities to

operate such equipment as high frequency radios which are not normally utilized in the Defense Communication System (DCS), but which could become critical in wartime.

The growth of the Agencies has had certain advantages in the training and development of highly skilled specialist personnel. The Defense Mapping Agency, DIA, and NSA appear to have particularly excellent systems for training and developing specialist personnel. Military officers in the Intelligence community are assigned throughout the various organizations, and a data bank is maintained on DoD civilian personnel capabilities and requirements which promotes their most effective career development, subject to the concurrence of their Service.

This issue, although not critical in a peacetime environment, can become so in a crisis or short war. The Department's personnel is its greatest asset. Their training and development are of great importance in peace as well as war.

Responsibility, Authority and Coordination with
JCS, the Services, and the U & S Commands

ISSUE - DO THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE DEFENSE AGENCIES AND THE JCS, THE SERVICES, AND THE U & S COMMANDS INCLUDE APPROPRIATE COORDINATION AND COMMENSURATE AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES?

The relationships between the Defense Agencies and the JCS, the Military Services, and the U & S Commands vary widely. In general, the creation of the unified Agency structure complicates an already complex set of relationships among OSD, the JCS, the Services and the U & S Commands. The basic difficulty, which is already described in the Steadman Report, lies in the divisions between mission responsibility and authority over resource allocation. These divisions violate fundamental principles of organizational management and military command responsibility. The Defense Agencies add an additional dimension to this problem. In this context we concluded that the gradual development of the Defense Agency system has placed an additional burden on an organizational system which was already strained by some inherent limitations.

We have been unable to examine this very broad issue in the comprehensive manner which it deserves.

However, we have found evidence of a number of specific problems, and found their validity sufficiently persuasive to cause us to conclude that this issue requires careful consideration in the study of the central issue we have recommended. These problems include the following:

- o The authority of some Agencies to levy requirements on the U & S Commands and the Services without commensurate responsibility for the operating missions.

- o The authority of the Services to levy various requirements on certain Agencies without commensurate fiscal responsibility.

- o The authority an Agency for quality inspection and acceptance of materiel whose utilization is the responsibility of the Services.

- o Less than optimum efficiency resulting from inadequate coordination.

- o A need for greater participation by the U & S Commanders in the review of major issues in the programs and budgets of the Defense Agencies.

Agencies with authority to levy requirements on or establish regulations and standards for the Services and the Unified and Specified Commands without commensurate

operational responsibility include DCA, DNA, DLA, and NSA. Specifications for security of nuclear weapons storage sites and priorities between strategic and tactical intelligence and communication are developed by the Agencies. But the U & S Commanders have responsibility for the tactical operations in the geographical areas concerned, and the Services have responsibility for funding the operations and maintenance and construction requirements. Such a division of authority for technical specifications and funding requires continuing close coordination to insure a balanced consideration of Agency concerns, such as safety and security, and the operational needs of the local commander who has the mission responsibility.

On the other hand, the Services have the authority to levy various requirements on certain Agencies without commensurate fiscal responsibility. Some examples include the ability of the Services to require DLA to perform extensive quality assurance tests on low value contracts and to order personnel security investigations by DIS without reimbursement. The efficiency of these procedures is questionable.

Problems appear to exist in the contract administrative support of service-peculiar items by DLA. The

customers of the DLA appear well satisfied with the support provided them in common commercial-type material, such as POL, subsistence, and off-the-shelf items. However, our review found many instances of faulty quality inspection and acceptance of service-peculiar materiel by DLA at manufacturer's plants. This resulted in costly stoppages of Service maintenance/production/rebuild lines and extensive litigation against the manufacturers. While we are unable to state with confidence that this problem is caused by the organizational arrangements for contract administration, we believe that they are at least a partial explanation. Efficient systems for supply of parts of major items require intensive management follow-up which is complicated by the division of authority and responsibility between DLA and the Services in this area. The Under Secretary for Research, Engineering, and Acquisition is currently reviewing these organizational relationships, and we believe that the foregoing problems should receive careful attention in that review.

As noted previously, the complexity of this organizational system requires extensive and close coordination. We found instances in which better

coordination could have contributed to greater efficiency. For example, concern was expressed by a senior official regarding the lack of timeliness of coordination by an Agency which manages a Defense program. He cited an instance which led to an inability by the Service to expend appropriated funds. While this is only a single case, which we were unable to pursue in greater depth, its significance is indicative of the desirability of consideration of this area in any follow-on study effort. Another case, described in an OMB budget issue, contended that failure by the Services to inform DLA of their plans to phase out weapon systems in their inventory had led to procurement of millions of dollars of excess repair parts. Inquiry indicated that this issue is very complex, and we were not able to find evidence which clearly supported or refuted it. On the other hand, the difficulties inherent in the differing reporting and management systems of the Services and the DLA indicated the potential for such a situation, and action appears warranted to preclude the possibility of waste in this area. The lack of full exchange of intelligence and counterintelligence information among the Agencies, Services, and the Unified and Specified Commands, which had been noted in previous reports, also appears to be a continuing problem.

An especially difficult problem of the support and services system for the operating forces, which was previously identified in the Steadman Report, is the imbalance between the operational responsibility of the U & S Commanders and their authority in the allocation of resources. This problem exists also in the allocation of much of the support and services provided by Defense Agencies to and within the U & S Commands. The CINC has only a limited voice in the resource allocation process (PPBS) for Agency activities which are important to his capacity to accomplish his operational mission. These include the design and installation of communications equipment, the collection and production of various types of intelligence, and the production of maps and charts. Quarterly readiness reports from the U & S Commanders, recently instituted by Secretary Brown, provide a useful dialogue in areas of research and development, force structure, resource allocation, and readiness. However, the existing budgetary process for Defense Agencies which provides critical communications, intelligence, MC&G, and logistic support to the Unified and Specified Commands does not provide any formal consideration of the CINC's priorities in the decision process on the Agency budgets.

CONCLUSIONS.

In general, we found that the Defense Agencies individually are generally well managed organizations, especially in considering their size, the scope of their responsibilities, and the complexity of their activities and their environment. Their managers are talented and their personnel are highly motivated and dedicated. However, in any large organization, improvements are possible in the management of scarce resources. In an organization of the size of the Defense Department, even modest improvements have the potential for effecting resource economies of large scale. Thus, the following conclusions or recommendations should not be regarded as being critical in any way of any personnel of the Department present or past. In fact, many relate to the incremental development of problems in conjunction with the growth of the Agency system over an extended span of time.

The Defense Agency form of organization is a consolidation or unification of support and service functions common to all the military services. In theory this provides improved economies, effectiveness, and efficiency through elimination of duplication and unproductive competition and a focus on the objectives of the Department. Since an Agency is generally

multi-Service in its personnel and leadership and does not report through a Military Department, it has the advantage of being perceived as giving equal support and service to all of the Military Services. It appears that the Agency form of organization is applicable only to support or service to the entire Department, not to a single Service. It should be a part of the Department's base structure and therefore should not normally operate in the geographical areas of the Unified Commanders overseas in peacetime, unless they will have such functions in wartime. In that event, the chain of command, especially in wartime or crisis, should be clearly defined.

The differing types of Agencies require different approaches. In this connection, the grouping of the Agencies into the functional categories of support of the operating forces, staff support, and audit/investigation can be useful. The Agencies engaged in support of the operating forces require particular attention in respect to readiness and responsiveness in wartime or crisis. Hence, they require close coordination with the JCS and the Unified/Specified Commanders. The agencies engaged in audit and investigation activities have a unique responsibility and special relationship to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Agencies whose primary functions are of a staff support nature have a close relationship to various elements of the

OSD staff. Resolution of the problems we have found can best be managed by recognition of these different categories of functions and the development of an approach for each issue appropriate for each different category of Agencies. We believe that, if the Defense Agency system is maintained, some sort of formal ties could be developed for these natural groupings. We share the concerns expressed about the patchwork nature of the current arrangements.

There is a need for a deliberate and systematic examination of the important and complex central issue found by this review as to the determination of the optimal future organization for support and services of the Armed Forces. This examination will permit the Secretary, the President, and the Congress, as appropriate to consider a full range of choices and decide the future direction for the organization of the Department. Many organizational possibilities exist for support and services of the armed forces. In addition to Defense Agencies we found the alternatives of a fifth Uniformed Service, Executive Agents, Single Managers, Joint Commands, the traditional support in each of the three Military Departments, and DoD Field Activities.

The examination of this central issue should not be conducted by this study group. Our conviction is

that studies should not normally recommend further study. In this case, however, we believe the recommendation appropriate, since our task was defined as "exploratory" and our objective was to determine whether further study was warranted. Many alternative approaches are possible for performing this study. They include its conduct by the Departmental staffs through normal staff procedures, by a small special staff group reporting directly to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary similar to that which performed the organization studies for the original agencies in the early 1960s, a large special Blue Ribbon Panel-type of group, a contract study performed outside the Department, or some combination of these.

This examination and subsequent implementation of its findings may require a lengthy period of time to insure achievement of its goals and preclude turbulence. Therefore, we have also considered the possibility of near-term improvements to the existing system of support and services. Within the foregoing context we have concluded that there are actions that can be taken now to:

- o Improve the responsiveness and readiness of the Defense Agencies, for crisis and war,
- o Strengthen the PPBS system of the Department for the Defense Agencies,

o Review the current system of personnel management, training and education of specialists in the Department, and

o Improve coordination among the Defense Agencies, the JCS, Military Services, and the Unified/Specified Commands.

NEAR-TERM ALTERNATIVES

General

o There is a need to inform commanders and managers and their staffs throughout the Department more fully about the present system of support and services. Since there have been no previous studies or publications describing this system, more emphasis needs to be given this subject in the War and Staff colleges and management training programs of the Armed Forces to ensure that it is fully understood.

o Any changes in the Defense Audit Agency, Defense Contract Audit Agency, and the Defense Investigative Service should await completion of the special study of Inspector General activities directed by the Congress.

o Clarification of the ambiguities in the chain of command of the Defense Agencies is needed as soon as possible in order to improve coordination and minimize policies/programs counterproductive to the objectives of the Department. Unfortunately, the key nature of this problem is such that any significant near-term improvements could prejudice the outcome of the deliberate study of the central issue which is essential. Therefore, any major changes should await the outcome of that analysis. The need for improvement in this area underscores the importance of its early initiation.

Improve Readiness and Responsiveness for Crisis or War

Since crises and war are the ultimate reasons for maintaining armed forces, near-term actions to improve the readiness posture of the Agencies are essential. While we believe this problem has organizational roots which will require its consideration in the process of study of the central issue, there are near-term actions which can be taken which will not prejudice the longer range alternatives. These apply to all agencies providing support and/or services to the operating forces and include the following alternatives:

- o Review by the Defense Agencies of their plans and broad planning procedures for general war, mobilization, and contingencies to ensure that they are adequate and up-to-date. Particular attention should be given to identification of shortfalls and potential vulnerabilities in war or crisis.

- o Establishment by the Secretary of Defense of a system of periodic review of Agency plans by the JCS and the appropriate Unified/Specified Commanders.

- o Institution of periodic readiness tests and exercises by the Defense Agencies and greater participation in the exercises of the JCS and the operating forces.

- o Review of the charters of the Agencies to ensure that the existing arrangements provide adequate coordination

with the JCS and the Unified/Specified Commanders in war and crisis.

- o Institution of a system of readiness reporting for the Agencies.

- o Review by the Defense Agencies of their personnel staffing to insure that military personnel are available for assignments which may require military staffing in the event of war or crisis.

Review of war and crisis planning by the Agencies should determine where gaps may exist and insure that plans are up-to-date. Periodic review of Agency plans by the JCS and the appropriate Unified/Specified Commanders would enhance the coordination between supporting and supported commands and improve responsiveness of the Agencies to the needs of the supported commands in war or crisis. It would also increase the attention of the Agencies to their war and crisis missions and help to point up potential vulnerabilities.

Enlarging the participation of Defense Agencies in JCS exercises and the instituting of Agency readiness tests and exercises will test the war and crisis capabilities of the Agencies providing support and service to the operating forces. It too will increase their focus on war and crisis missions and should identify problem areas which may exist or develop during

war or crisis so that corrective actions can be taken or preparations made for dealing with them. The recent JCS exercise Nifty Nugget was very effective in determining where shortcomings exist in certain aspects of the support area. Exercises of this type with independent observers can be employed to improve the readiness and responsiveness of the Defense Agencies.

The complexity of the relationships between the various Agencies and the JCS and Unified/Specified Commanders indicates that the current charters of the Agencies should be reviewed to insure that they are consistent with the requirements for responsiveness and readiness in war or crisis.

The need for an improved system of readiness reporting for the combatant forces through the Unified/Specified Commanders and the CJCS was pointed out in the Steadman Report. A system of readiness reporting by the Defense Agencies is also needed to enhance their readiness and alert all managers and commanders to potential readiness problems. Inclusion of an evaluation by the CJCS and the Unified/Specified Commanders of the support and services provided by the Defense Agencies in their periodic reports to the Secretary of Defense would enhance the knowledge of the top management of the Department of Defense readiness problems in the support/services area and enable corrective actions to be taken.

Improve the PPBS to give greater attention to Agency
Programs and Budgets.

Actions in this area are important to insure careful review of Agency programs and budgets and their coordination with those of the Services. They should not prejudice follow-on study of the central issue. Alternatives include:

- o Direct the Under Secretary for Policy, in coordination with the JCS, to include in the policy guidance provided in the Annual CG, a more definitive evaluation of national interests and objectives, potential future threats, and the context of broad resource constraints to guide the allocation of resources in the area of support and services. Insure appropriate staffing for this purpose.

- o Direct the ASD(PA&E) to provide more specific program guidance and more intensive scrutiny for Agency POMs and budgets within his office. Insure appropriate staffing for this purpose.

- o Direct the CJCS to provide recommendations to the Secretary on the programs and budgets of the Agencies supporting the operating forces, in parallel with those of the Services proposed by the Steadman Report. Insure appropriate staffing for this purpose.

Directing the USD(P) in coordination with the JCS to furnish broad policy guidance sufficient to guide resource allocation by the Agencies would deal with

problems already highlighted in the Ignatius, Steadman, and Rice Studies. The Secretary has directed the USD(P) to undertake this task. This policy guidance could be of more value for resource allocation in such areas as MC&G, communications, and intelligence if it presented a more definitive appreciation of national interests, potential threats, and the context of broad resource constraints. The difficulty and sensitivity of this task are apparent. Nevertheless, we believe that it is not only feasible but important. The alternative is to leave to the individual resource managers the responsibility for judgments as to national interests and the potential threats. The various programs would then proceed from a range of different bases.

Directing the ASD(PA&E) to give more scrutiny to Agency POMs and budget would have the advantages of providing closer oversight by a neutral arbiter over the programs and budgets of the Agencies. It would avoid the assignment of program/budget review to the OSD staff agencies that formulate Agency policy guidance. Moreover, it should facilitate a Department-wide balance in programs and budgets between wholesale and retail support and strategic and tactical services. Giving the ASD(PA&E) this responsibility would also facilitate balance between the Service and Agency POMs.

Increased participation by the CJCS in a broad order-of-magnitude review of the Agency POMs and budgets would give military advice to the Secretary in this important area. The Steadman Report recommended that the CJCS be given an enhanced role and appropriate staff support in providing advice to the Secretary in the area of resource allocation. Inclusion of the Agency programs and budgets would enhance the balance between Agency and Service programs, by insuring that the perspectives of the Unified/Specified Commanders are considered.

Personnel Training and Development

The following alternatives could enhance the integrated training and career development of military and civilian specialist personnel in DoD to insure that future needs are met. No impact is foreseen on study of the central issue.

- o Direct the ASD MRA&L to review Service and Agency requirements for specialist personnel and their availability in the functional areas where Agencies exist.

- o Direct the ASD MRA&L to establish and maintain a data base of Service and Agency civilian personnel and requirements in key specialist career fields.

A review by the ASD MRA&L, assisted by all the Departmental staffs, of specialist personnel requirements and availability would ensure the identification of any gaps that may have developed as a result of the current system of Defense Agencies. The ASD MRA&L could then initiate appropriate action to ensure that these gaps were filled by either the Services or the Agencies. Maintenance of a Department-wide data base of civilian specialist personnel and requirements for these personnel could enhance their broad development among the various Services and Agencies. Maintenance of such a data base by the ASD MRA&L would have the disadvantage of requiring an enlargement in the OSD staff. Time has precluded a complete investigation of the ramifications of this alternative. Therefore, we do not recommend it at this time. However, we believe that it should be considered by the ASD MRA&L after completion of the review of specialist personnel.

Improving Coordination and the Authority-Responsibility Balance

In the near term, the following alternatives should be considered to enhance coordination and alleviate present imbalances:

- o All Unified and Specified Commands should be required to provide annually a master resource priority list to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman

JCS, in order to insure that the needs of the combat forces receive adequate consideration in the DoD resource allocation process.

- o Policy Councils should be established for each Agency with representatives of OSD, the Services, and the JCS to advise on/participate in the formulation of broad Agency policies. The JCS representatives should represent the requirements of the U & S Commanders.

- o When appropriate, Agencies operating in the geographical area of a Unified Command should designate a single Senior Agency Representative to insure coordination at appropriate levels of management and to insure that the Command's needs are met expeditiously.

- o Significant policy or program issues involving Agencies supporting the operating forces should be coordinated with the Services, the JCS, and the U & S Commands prior to implementation.

The Steadman Report suggested that the Unified and Specified Commanders provide a master resource priority list, similar to that now prepared by USEUCOM, to insure that the needs of the combat forces receive adequate consideration in the DoD resource allocation process. The Chairman JCS would then represent the

Unified and Specified Commands in making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on resource allocation decisions. Our findings reaffirm the need for such an arrangement. It is important that these priorities include the priorities for support by the Agencies as well as the Services. This would insure that the Unified and Specified Commanders would have a more appropriate voice in the resource allocation for the support of their commands.

The concept of having Policy Councils to advise/participate with the Agency Directors in formulation of broad policy in specialized areas has been recommended by many officials of the Department. It could enhance coordination of Agency policies with OSD, the Services, the JCS, and the Unified and Specified Commands and provide a forum for exchange of views. The concept is analagous to that of corporate Boards of Directors in the private sector. The question of whether such councils should only advise the Agency Director or be engaged with him in participatory management on the corporate model is a sensitive one. To conform to the principle of individual responsibility and commensurate authority we would lean toward leaving the decision to the Agency Director.

As a minimum, such councils could serve a coordinating function. Disadvantages could accrue if the Councils were not properly utilized and merely become a bureaucratic paper mill that consumed the time of busy executives.

The practice of stationing a senior rank Defense Agency representative at Unified/Specified Command Headquarters has been implemented by some of the key agencies with effective results. The advantages of the day-by-day presence in-theater of a responsible agency member, able to translate potential agency assistance into real time tactical problem solving, is recognized as valuable by the Unified/Specified Commanders. It would give the Agency Director a means of maintaining a continuous supervision of problem areas consistent with the principle of support responsibility from rear to front. It would facilitate timely follow-up actions by the supported commands. This approach, however, should not be extended to the point of proliferating Agency representatives where they are not needed.

Insisting that policy or program changes be coordinated with the Services, JCS, and Unified and Specified Commands has the advantage of being easily implemented. Further, it would assure that all perspectives are

carefully considered before a proposed change is made. Agencies themselves should also be required to coordinate significant changes in procedures or programs with the same organizations to avoid any unintended adverse impact on the operating forces.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recapitulate the principal recommendations of this review. The Secretary of Defense should:

- o Direct a comprehensive study to determine the optimal future organization for support and services of the Armed Forces.

- o Direct the implementation of the measures proposed to improve the responsiveness and readiness of the Defense Agencies providing support and services to the operating forces.

- o Direct the USD(P), ASD(PA&E), and the Chairman, JCS to take the actions necessary to improve the PPB system for Agency programs and budgets.

- o Direct the ASD MRA&L to review the Service and Agency requirements for and availability of specialists in order to identify gaps and initiate appropriate corrective actions.

- o Direct the Chairman, JCS, the OSD, the Services, and the Directors of Defense Agencies to implement the measures described to improve coordination.

GLOSSARY

AFSWP	Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ASD(C)	Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller
ASD(C ³ I)	Assistant Secretary of Defense, Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence
ASD(ISA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
ASD(MRA&L)	Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics
ASD(PA&E)	Assistant Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation
CG	Consolidated Guidance
CHAMPUS	Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CINCMAC	Commander-in-Chief, Military Airlift Command
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CONUS	Continental United States
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DAS	Defense Audit Service
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCAA	Defense Contract Audit Agency
DCAS	Defense Contract Administration Service
DCPA	Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
DCS	Defense Communication System
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIS	Defense Investigative Service
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
E ³	Efficiency, Economy and Effectiveness
FY	Fiscal Year
GSA	General Services Administration
IL&FM	Installations, Logistics and Financial Management

JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSTPS	Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MC&G	Mapping, Charting and Geodesy
MRA&L	Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA	National Security Agency
OMB	Office of Manpower and Budget
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA&E	Program Analysis and Evaluation
POL	Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants
POM	Program Objectives Memorandum
PPB	Planning, Programming, Budgeting
PPBS	Planning, Programming, Budgeting System
PRM	Presidential Review Memorandum
SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan
TOA	Transportation Operating Agency
TRIMIS	Tri-Service Medical Information System
U & S	Unified and Specified
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USDR&E	Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USREDCOM	United States Readiness Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

of the
DEFENSE AGENCY REVIEW

APPENDICES

APPENDICES

OF THE

DEFENSE AGENCY REVIEW

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

18 SEP 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ADVISOR FOR NATO AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Department of Defense Organization Studies

As a part of the Defense Organization Study, a review of Defense Agencies is planned. This project will complement the recently completed studies on Headquarters Management and on the National Military Command Structure, and the on-going study of Resource Management. It is envisioned that this project will encompass, at a minimum, a review of the roles, functions, and responsibilities of the various Defense Agencies. Terms of Reference for the first phase of the study are attached.

Major General Theodore Antonelli, USA (Retired), the former Commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, has been selected to serve as the Project Director. Each of the Military Departments have been asked to provide a member for the study group.

The success of this effort will depend upon the cooperation and advice of the Defense Agencies. General Antonelli will contact the Agency directors at an early date to obtain their recommendations for the conduct of the study.


John G. Kester
The Special Assistant

Attachment

cc: Directors of the Defense Agencies

APPENDIX A

14 September 1978

DEFENSE AGENCY REVIEW

Draft Tentative Study Plan

1. Purpose: To conduct an exploratory review of Defense Agencies which will complement current studies initiated in response to the President's Reorganization Program.
2. Methodology: Research and interviews with knowledgeable individuals.
3. Approach:

1-30 September

- Assemble and organize study group
- Develop draft areas of inquiry
- Conduct initial meetings with agency heads and other responsible DoD officials to coordinate areas of inquiry and secure comments/recommendations

1 October - 30 November

1. Examine evolution of Defense Agencies (DAS)
 - o McCormick-Curtis Amendment of 1958 and related Congressional discussion
 - o Executive Orders and DoD Directives which established DAS or changed basic roles/missions/authority
 - o Relevant recommendations of major public reports on DoD, e.g., 1970 Blue Ribbon Panel and 1974 Murphy Commission Reports
2. Examine current mission, functions, organization and relationships of the DAS
3. Identify factors that affect the existence, relationships, performance, size, scope, and resources of DAS functions
4. Examine the relationship of those functions to the mission and organizational functions of the existing DAS structure
5. Examine functions which have been placed in the DAS structure with emphasis on wartime effectiveness, peacetime efficiency and effectiveness, mission performance, responsiveness, and customer satisfaction.
6. Examine relationships among DAS, SecDef/OSD, JCS, Military Departments and Unified/Specified Commands regarding the allocation and performance of key support functions

7. Consider major problems reported by DAS in accomplishment of missions
8. Consider major problems of consumers of DAS support/services and of DoD Agencies which oversee DAS
9. Identify candidate functions which may be appropriate for consolidation into the DAS structure
10. Identify candidate functions, currently in the DAS structure which may be better handled outside of the DAS structure
11. Develop options for further study effort; among others:
 - o Examine several support functions in depth, emphasizing the appropriate organizational structures for their performance
 - o Examine issues common to all or most agencies
 - o Examine all agencies in depth -- extend length of study effort
 - o Defer further study or terminate.

APPENDIX B

DEFENSE AGENCY MISSION AND FUNCTIONS

The current mission and functions of the eleven Defense Agencies which we considered are as follows:

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency: DARPA reports to the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering and manages and directs the conduct of selected advanced research and development projects for the Department of Defense. It provides a means of high level attention and management for high risk, high potential ideas requiring long term development and testing by serving as a DoD sponsor for new technological ideas which have no direct or apparent application to one of the Services.

Defense Audit Service: DAS plans and performs: internal audits of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, and all Defense Agencies; inter-service audits in all DoD components; audits of the Security Assistance Program at all levels of management; and other audits as requested. DAS reports to the Assistant Secretary (Comptroller) but is authorized direct access to the Secretary.

Defense Communications Agency: Its responsibilities entail system engineering, management control, and operational direction of the Defense Communications System, and system engineering and other technical support to the National Military Command System. DCA reports to the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretary for Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence and responds to the Chairman, JCS on operational matters and communications requirements associated with joint planning.

Defense Contract Audit Agency: DCAA reports to the Assistant Secretary (Comptroller) and is responsible for providing contract audit and financial advisory services to DoD components responsible for procurement and contract administration. It facilitates prudent contracting by providing financial information and advice on proposed or existing contracts and contractors in connection with the negotiation, administration, and settlement of contracts. Contract audit service on a reimbursable basis is also provided to approximately twenty-five other government agencies.

Defense Intelligence Agency: Its mission is to satisfy the foreign military intelligence requirements of

the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, major components of the Defense Department and the National Foreign Intelligence Board. It provides central management for the Defense Attache System. DIA reports to the Secretary of Defense and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Staff supervision of the DIA for the Secretary of Defense is exercised by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence) with respect to resources and by the Under Secretary for Policy with respect to policy matters.

Defense Investigative Service: This Agency was established to provide a single centrally directed personnel security investigations service to develop information upon which the DoD components can make a determination as to the suitability of individuals for employment in positions of trust. The DIS also furnishes criminal investigations support and conducts crime prevention surveys for the Defense Logistics Agency. A small Special Investigations Unit conducts additional missions as directed by appropriate authorities. DIS reports to the General Counsel.

Defense Logistics Agency: DLA is responsible for providing supply, contract administration, and technical and logistics support services to the Military Services. Its functions include the wholesale supply of POL products, subsistence, and selected consumables, cataloging, property disposal, DoD-owned plant equipment, and operating a Defense Documentation Center. DLA reports to the Assistant Secretary (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics).

Defense Mapping Agency: DMA provides mapping, charting, and geodetic support to the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other DoD components, and other government agencies on a reimbursement basis. DMA reports to the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering. It also responds directly to the Chairman, JCS on operational matters and requirements associated with joint planning.

Defense Nuclear Agency: DNA manages DoD nuclear weapons effects research and testing programs, provides advice on nuclear weapons safety and security, and manages the DoD nuclear weapons stockpile. It conducts technical inspections, maintains nuclear effects test capability, and conducts test exercises. The Agency is under the direction, authority, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense

for Research and Engineering and is supervised by the Chairman, JCS (for the JCS) for military aspects of DNA activities.

Defense Security Assistance Agency: Has the mission of directing, administering, and supervising the execution of approved security assistance plans and programs. DSAA also formulates detailed security assistance programs for the approval of the Secretary of Defense in accordance with guidelines promulgated by the Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs), to whom DSAA reports.

National Security Agency/Central Security Service: Is responsible for centralized coordination, direction and performance of highly specialized technical functions in support of US Government activities to protect US communications and to collect foreign intelligence information. NSA/CSS reports directly to the Secretary of Defense.

EXISTING DoD ORGANIZATIONS FOR INTEGRATED
SUPPORT AND SERVICES

Defense-wide assignments are commonly called "Executive Agent Responsibilities," "Single Manager," "Lead Service," or simply "Delegations of Authority." Official definitions do not currently exist for these terms and they are often used interchangeably. The documentation for each assignment--a Public Law, a DoD Directive of Instruction, a Letter of Assignment, etc.--specifies responsibilities and authority. The following unofficial definitions are provided in an effort to facilitate understanding of these terms:

EXECUTIVE AGENT.

A Military Department designated by the Secretary of Defense which has been assigned responsibility and delegated authority to carry out certain functions and duties.

SINGLE MANAGER.

A Military Department designated by the Secretary of Defense to be responsible for management of specified commodities or common service activities on a Department of Defense-wide basis.

LEAD SERVICE.

A Military Department designated by the Secretary of Defense for the management of a specific item or program.

FIELD OPERATING ACTIVITY.

An organization which has the primary mission of executing policy and would still be required in the absence of the headquarters to which it reports.

Attached are listings of these assignments for each of the Services. The listings include all those identified to date. Maintenance of a central file of up-to-date listings of assignments of these types on an ongoing basis would appear to be desirable.

EXECUTIVE AGENT FUNCTIONS

1. Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG) Modernization Program. (A)*
2. Saudi Arabia Army Ordnance Corps Program. (A)
3. Supply Support of United Nations Peacekeeping Forces. (A)
4. Customs. (A)
5. Railroads for National Defense. (A)
6. Highways for National Defense. (A)
7. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation on Chemical Weapons and Chemical and Biological Defense. (A)
8. Mobile Electric Power Project Manager. (A)
9. DoD Civilian Career Knowledge Tests. (A)
10. DoD Law of War Program. (A)
11. DoD Enemy Prisoner of War/Detainee Program. (A)
12. Defense Language Program. (A)
13. Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES). (A)
14. Drug Abuse Testing Program. (A)
15. American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) Radio and Television Stations. (A)
16. Confederation of Interallied Reserve Officers (CIOR). (A)
17. The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve. (A)
18. Annual Report on the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction by Foreign Tribunals Over United States Personnel. (A)
19. Quarterly Report of US Personnel in Post-Trial Confinement in Foreign Penal Institutions Pursuant to Sentence of Foreign Courts. (A)

* (A) Army; (N) Navy; (AF) Air Force

Executive Agent Functions-continued

20. Support of the District of Columbia Government in Combating Crime. (A)
21. Domestic Disaster Relief. (A)
22. Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) Program. (A)
23. Representation on Federal Preparedness Agency/General Services Agency (FPA/GSA) Regional Field Boards. (A)
24. Support to the United States Postal Services *USPS). (A)
25. Use of Military Resources in the Event of Civil Disturbances. (A)
26. Support to the FBI in Combating Terrorism. (A)
27. Disease Control. (A)
28. Pest Control. (A)
29. Armed Services Medical Regulating Office. (A)
30. Records Management Support of Joint Activities. (A)
31. Registry Division Support of United States Security Authority. (A)
32. Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI). (A)
33. DoD Explosives Safety Board. (A)
34. Service Flag and Lapel Button. (A)
35. Armed Forces Courier Services (ARFCOS). (A)
36. NATO Infrastructure. (A)
37. Recruiting Facilities. (A)
38. DoD Food Research, Development, Testing and Engineering Program. (A)
39. Armed Forces Staff College. (N)
40. GAPFILLER. (Type of Satellite). (N)

Executive Agent Functions-continued

41. Fleet Satellite Communications and Lease Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM and LEASATCOM). (N)
42. Tactical Air Control System/Tactical Air Defense System (TAC/TADS). (N)
43. Cryptologic Training. (N)
44. DoD Computer Institute (DODCI). (N)
45. R-2508 Enhancement Program Including Procurement, Agreement Lead, Program Management and Operation and Management of the Program. (AF)
46. Electromagnetic Compatability Analysis Center (ECAC). (AF)
47. The Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) Program PE 63370F, PE 63370N, PE 64314F. (AF)
48. The Tri-Service Laser Seeker Development Program. (AF)
49. BWM34A and PQM 102 Drones. (AF)
50. The Joint Tactical Information Distribution System. (AF)
51. NAVSTAR Global Positioning System. (AF)
52. Management and Operation of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). (AF)
53. The Space Test Program. (AF)
54. Space Segment of Defense Satellite Communications System. (AF)
55. Digital European Backbone and Automated Technical Control. (AF)
56. E-4 Program (Airborne Command Post). (AF)
57. Supporting State Department in Providing Full Protection for Crown Prince of Iran. (AF)
58. Coordination of Combined Criminal-Investigative Support to Army, Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES). (AF)

Executive Agent Functions-continued

59. Foreign Dignitaries Visiting the United States as Guests of the SECDEF or CJCS. (AF)
60. Foreign Service Schools Under the JCS MOP 130. (AF)
61. Conduct a Joint Test of the Vulnerability of US Data Links to Countermeasures (DUAL). (AF)
62. Armed Forces High School Recruiting and Testing Program. (AF)
63. Joint Test of Electronic Warfare in Close Air Support. (AF)
64. DoD Scientific and Technical Intelligence and Foreign Technology Data Base and Information Handling System. (AF)
65. The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) Research and Development. (AF)
66. Higher Order Language Control for NOVIAL. (AF)
67. Administration of Lincoln Laboratory. (AF)
68. Defense Dissemination Program. (AF)
69. Accepts Service of Process in Litigation Involving the Secretary of Defense Acting in his Official Capacity for Cases Filed in the District of Columbia. (AF)
70. Prepares an Annual Digest of War and Emergency Legislation Affecting the Department of Defense. (AF)
71. The DoD Medical Examination Review Board. (AF)
72. The Military Blood Program. (AF)
73. MARK XII IFF System (AIMS). (AF)
74. DoD Representative to the Aerospace Sector, American National Metric Council. (AF)
75. "Air Transportation Eligibility." (AF)
76. Operational Activities of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. (AF)

Executive Agent Functions-continued

77. Artic Resupply of Government Installations. (AF)
78. US-UK Negotiations and Awarding of Contracts and Procurement of Vehicles. (AF)
79. Certain American Forces Radio and Television Outlets and Circuit Manager of MINI-TV in Designated Areas. (AF)
80. The Secretary of the Air Force will Determine Whether the Service Rendered by a Group Shall be Considered Active Military Service for the Purpose of PL 95-202. (AF)
81. DoD News Clipping and Analysis Service. (AF)
82. Alaskan Forces Satellite Forces. (AF)
83. The United Services Organization and Professional Entertainment Group. (AF)
84. Coordinating with Federal Government Agencies on Civil Aviation Matters Pertaining to DoD Mission Within Alaska. (AF)
85. Coordinating Authority for All Joint Military Administrative and Logistic Matters in Alaska. Military Point-of-Contact for the State of Alaska. (AF)
86. Providing Jewish Chaplain Program for All Military Personnel in Alaska. (AF)
87. Development and Coordination of Planning for the Defense of Alaska. (AF)
88. CINCPAC/COMAAC Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). (AF)
89. USCG/AAC Search and Rescue Agreements. (AF)
90. Support of Numerous Off-Base DoD Agencies. (AF)
91. Uniform Administration of Temporary Lodging Allowance for All Services in Alaska. (AF)
92. Command Center Processing and Display System (CCPDS). (AF)
93. Worldwide Airborne Command Post (WWABNCP) Ground Communications System (Ground Entry Points). (AF)

Executive Agent Functions-continued

94. Operation of the Security Assistance Accounting Center. (AF)
95. Control of COBOL/FORTRAN Programming Languages. (AF)
96. Providing English Language Training for Allied Students. (AF)
97. Training and Research in Security Assistance Programs. (AF)
98. Providing Air Intelligence Training. (AF)
99. Providing Training in Application of Sensor Systems. (AF)
100. Providing Nuclear Weapons Orientation/Application Training. (AF)
101. Federal Legal Information Through Electronics. (AF)
102. 490L Overseas AUTODIN System. (AF)
103. Air Force Aircraft Clearance Authority (ACA). (AF)
104. Operating Procedures for US Military Aircraft over the High Seas. (AF)
105. Unified/Specified Command Airborne Command Posts. (AF)
106. WWMCCS Single Service Training Manager. (AF)
107. AFSATCOM I. (AG)
108. Tempest Training. (AF)
109. Rivit Switch Air/Ground Radios. (AF)
110. Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTDIS). (AF)
111. WWMCCS Single Service Logistic Support Program. (AF)
112. WWMCCS Selection and Acquisition Agent-Successor Contracting Officer. (AF)
113. DoD Common Air Intelligence Training. (AF)

Executive Agent Functions-continued

114. Defense Sensor Interpretation and Application Training. (AF)
115. DoD Voice Processing, Analysis and Reporting and STREAMLINER Cryptologic Training. (AF)
116. DoD AN/GYQ(V) Intelligence Data Handling Application Training. (AF)
117. Consolidated Classification List (CCL). (AF)
118. Development and Maintenance of NATO Electronic Warfare Data Base. (AF)
119. Lincoln Exp Satellite (Scope Dawn). (AF)
120. Strategic Aerospace Reconnaissance. (AF)
121. Security Control of Air Traffic and Air Navigation Aids. (AF)
122. Air Traffic Control and Naval Aids for all US Military Aircraft in EUCOM. (AF)
123. The NASA Astronaut Selection Program (Military Personnel Only). (AF)
124. Operation of the Defense Race Relations Institute. (AF)
125. Identifying Needs and Acquiring Intelligence Information Support Systems for Tactical Air Forces. (AF)
126. Operation of the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center. (AF)
127. Overall Agreement Between the Governments of Denmark and United States Concerning Operation of Certain Aeronautical Facilities and Services in Greenland. (AF)
128. Custodian for NATO Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS). (AF)
129. Federal Simulation Center (FEDSIM). (AF)
130. Operation of the European Special Activity Facility. (AF)

Executive Agent Functions--continued

131. Responsible for the Design and Execution of Military Construction in the United Kingdom and Ireland and Selected Continental European Areas. (AF)
132. Mortuary Affairs in Selected European Countries. (AF)
133. Administration of Housing DoD Personnel in the Kaiserslautern Area. (AF)
134. The Armed Forces Discipline Control Board. (AF)
135. Conducting Formal Courses for all Services in Radio, Telephone, Analysis and Reporting (SIGINT) Training. (AF)
136. Training Courses on the WMMC. (AF)
137. Code of Conduct Training. (AF)
138. The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). (AF)
139. Coordination, Search and Rescue in Inland Regions. (AF)
140. DoD Civilian/Military Service Review Board. (AF)

There are three additional classified functions for which the Air Force is Executive Agent.

SINGLE MANAGER FUNCTIONS

1. Conventional Ammunition. (A)
2. Management of Military Traffic, Land Transportation and Common User Ocean Terminals. (A)
3. Processing Claims. (A)
4. Representation of DoD and All Military Services before Federal and State Regulatory Agencies in CONUS Transportation Matters. (A)
5. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology and Training. (N)
6. Precise Time and Time Interval. (N)
7. Joint Service Explosive Ordnance Disposal Development. (N)
8. Anti-Compromise Emergency Destruction System. (N)
9. Ocean Transportation. (N)
10. Test and Evaluation of Aircraft Inertial Navigation Systems. (AF)
11. Conducting Personnel Security Investigators Course for Defense Investigative Service. (AF)
12. Frequency Coordination of Eastern and Gulf Areas. (AF)
13. The Defense Support Program. (AF)
14. Satellite Data System. (AF)
15. Defense Satellite Communications System. (AF)
16. Air Force Satellite Communication. (AF)
17. Claims Responsibilities in Numerous Countries. (AF)
18. The Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center. (AF)
19. Airlift Service/Airlift Service Industrial Fund. (AF)

Single Manager Functions-continued

20. Operation of Air Mail Terminals in Selected Areas. (AF)
21. Operation of 20 Beds for Veterans Administration Beneficiaries. (AF)
22. Providing Food Inspection to Commercial Seafood Processing Plants. (AF)
23. All A-37 Formal Training which Serves ANG, MAAG Personnel and Foreign Military Personnel. (AF)
24. Medical Service to US Coast Guard, Governors Island, NY. (AF)
25. Air-to-Air Refueling Operations for KC-135. (AF)
26. Budgeting, Programming, Supporting and Planning for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Alerting Network (JCSAN). (AF)
27. Worldwide Secure Voice Conferencing System (WWSVCS). (AF)
28. Providing Essential 24 Hour-a-Day Radio Communications in the Washington, D.C. Area. (AF)
29. Programming, Budgeting and Financing the National Military Command Center (NMCC) Communications Support Systems. (AF)
30. Providing Emergency Radio Communications in the Washington, D.C. Area. (AF)
31. Joint Chiefs of Staff Automatic Conference Arranger (JCSACA). (AF)
32. Development, Maintenance, Publication and Distribution of the Joint Directives on Uniform Settlement of Military Freight Loss and Damage Claim. (AF)
33. Procurement Responsibilities and Single Service Logistic Support Management for DoD Use of AN/GYQ-21 (V) Computer Systems. (AF)
34. Providing Pilot Training to the German Air Force. (AF)
35. Aviation Emergency Services. (AF)

Single Manager Functions-continued

36. Providing Instruction/Aid for Allied Officers in Language, Culture and US Civil Law. (AF)
37. Providing Teletype/Communications Training for Special Telecommunications Equipment. (AF)
38. Repair of Inertial Guidance Systems for Aircraft and Missiles. (AF)
39. Missile Warning and Attack Assessment. (AF)
40. Space Surveillance/Space Defense. (AF)
41. Responsible for Logistics, Funding and Enhancement of the Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System (IEMTS). (AF)
42. AN/TPN-28 Dual-Bank Beacon Procurement. (AF)
43. All Range Measuring System/Simulated Combat Operations Range Equipment (RMS/SCORE) owned by DoD. (AF)
44. Responsible for Providing Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction Service in Selected European and Mid-East Countries. (AF)
45. Responsible for Providing DoD Foreign Tax Relief Service in Selected European and Mid-East Countries. (AF)
46. Responsible for Processing and Adjudicating Claims in Selected European and Mid-East Countries. (AF)
47. Responsible for Management of USO Shows in Selected European Countries. (AF)
48. Responsible for Management of Temporary Lodging Allowances (TLA) in Selected European Countries. (AF)
49. Local National Labor Matters in Selected European Countries. (AF)
50. Providing Civilian Personnel Services to DoD School System, Defense Program, Defense Commercial Communications Office and EUCOM Support. (AF)

Single Manager Functions-continued

51. DoD Representation to the Committee for European Air Space Coordination. (AF)
52. Communication Support to the CINCEUR Airborne Command Post. (AF)
53. Maintenance and Maintenance Support of Weather and Weather Communications Equipment in Support of USAREUR. (AF)
54. Imagery Interpretation Keys for DIA. (AF)
55. IOT&E of DoD Base and Installation Security System Equipment. (AF)
56. Demonstration of Applications of ADP to Improve WWMCCS. (AF)
57. Operation of the Joint Communications Facility. (AF)
58. The Production of Survival, Evasion Resistance, and Escape Contingency Guides. (AF)
59. Logistics Support Manager for the AN/GYQ-21(V) Computer System. (AF)
60. Responsible for the Software Development of the DoD Intelligence Information System Standard Mini Computer. (AF)
61. NOTAM Service. (AF)
62. Weather and NOTAM Communications Systems. (AF)
63. Off-Shore Inspection of Meat and Meat-Producing/Processing Plants for England and Ireland. (AF)
64. Development and Publication of USEUCOM Emergency Action Checklists. (AF)
65. US Military Air Operations in the Berlin Air Corridor. (AF)
66. Central Vehicle Registration for US Military (Less Navy) in United Kingdom. (AF)
67. Verification and Payment for Facilities Provided US Military Aircraft by the Agency for Safety of Air Navigation in Europe, Africa and Madagascar. (AF)

Single Manager Functions-continued

- 68. Airlift Services. (AF)
- 69. Airborne Weather Reconnaissance. (AF)
- 70. DoD Inventory Manager and Depot Maintenance
Inter-Servicing Agent for COMSEC Selected
Equipment. (AF)
- 71. The Responsibility to Develop Word Call Signs to
Support NSA and Service Requirements. (AF)

There are 15 additional classified functions for which
Air Force is Single Manager.

LEAD SERVICE FUNCTIONS

1. Tactical Shelter Program. (A)
2. Microwave Landing System. (A)
3. Tri Service 2.75 Inch Rocket. (A)
4. Control of Open Burning of Waste Munitions. (A)
5. Seaguard. (N)
6. Submarine Air Defense. (N)
7. Air Deployable Array Sonar (ADAS) (Spray Array). (N)
8. Maritime Patrol Aircraft Propeller Study. (N)
9. Recovery Assist Securing Transversing (RAST)
(Equipment Integration). (N)
10. Light Airborne Multipurpose Sensor (LAMPS MK III)
(Avionics Integration). (N)
11. Undersea Surveillance. (N)
12. Advanced Signal Processor (ASP) (NORAD Use). (N)
13. Special Electro Magnetic Interference (SEMI). (N)
14. SPARROW (Name of Missile) Air Intercept Missile
(AIM-7F). (N)
15. Captive Carry of Air Intercept Missile (AIM-9L)
Sidewinder. (N)
16. Hi-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM). (N)
17. Air Combat Maneuvering Range (ACMR). (N)
18. Air Combat Maneuvering Range Air to Ground
Capability Program. (N)
19. Air Delivery 2d Generation Fuel-Air Explosive
Weapon. (N)
20. Bomb Live Unit (BLU-95/B). (N)
21. Bomb Live Unit (BLU-96/B). (N)

Lead Service Functions - continued

22. Chemical Warfare/Chemical Biological Defense (CW/CBD) Countermeasure. (N)
23. Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network-Message Processing System (MEECN MPS). (N)
24. BIG EYE (Name of Bomb). (N)
25. Sidewinder AIM-9M (Name of Missile). (N)
26. Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA). (N)
27. Electromagnetic Countermeasure (EMC) Specifications and Standards. (N)
28. Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN) Message Processing. (N)
29. Cartridge Activated Devices/Pilot Activated Devices. (N)
30. Ground Squirrel Population Control. (A)
31. Air Force Test and Evaluation Center serves for the Air Force as Lead/Executive Service for Numerous OT&E Projects. Examples: Electronic Warfare/Close Air Support, Data Link Vulnerability, IFFN, Laser Guided Weapons/Close Air Support. (AF)
32. Emergency Disablement System for Nuclear Weapons Program. (AF)
33. The GLCM Warhead (W84), B-61 Bomb, B-83 Bomb, ALCM Warhead (W80), ASALM Warhead, M-X Warhead, MK-12A War-head (W78). (AF)
34. Advanced Ballistic Reentry Systems. (AF)
35. Aerospace Systems Intelligence. (AF)
36. Assuring Consistency in the Settlement of the Washington Office Audits of Defense Contractors Completed by DCAA. (AF)
37. Maintaining and Updating Specifications Pertaining to: (1) Rocket Engines and Components; (2) Liquid Propellant Fuels and Oxidizers, Chemical Base; (3) Liquid Propellant Fuels, Petroleum Base. (AF)

Lead Service Functions-continued

38. The Development of Nuclear Weapons, Phases 1, 2 and 3. (AF)
39. Study of the Aerospace Industries Association Proposals Relating to Investigation of Aircraft Mishaps. (AF)
40. The Hospital Information System. (AF)
41. Network Interface System. (AF)
42. The Tri-Radiology System. (AF)
43. The Computer-Assisted Instruction for Continuing Medical Education. (AF)
44. The Military Medical Capitation Budgeting Project. (AF)
45. Budget for Base-Procured Investment Equipment. (AF)
46. Perform Selected Administrative Functions for OSD. (AF)
47. Development of an Improved Method for Determining AC Engine Requirements. (AF)
48. Selected Energy-Motivated R&D Efforts. (AF)
49. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area Resource Recovery Report for Anchorage, Alaska. (AF)
50. Providing Advertising Administration for Health Profession Recruitment. (AF)
51. Providing Navigator Training for DoD. (AF)
52. Providing Training for DoD Agencies in a Number of Fields. (AF)
53. Providing Training of Allied Students in a Number of Fields. (AF)
54. Providing Tactical Communications Training. (AF)
55. Providing DoD Base and Installation Security System (BISS) Training Manager. (AF)
56. DoD Joint Oil Analysis Program. (AF)

Lead Service Functions-continued

57. DoD Representative to Committee for European Airspace Coordination. (AF)
58. Digital European Backbone. (AF)
59. Auto Tech Control Program. (AF)
60. Philippines/Japan/Korea Digital Upgrade. (AF)
61. Defense Metro Area Telephone System. (AF)
62. AUTODIN II. (AF)
63. Teletype Replacement Program. (AF)
64. Space COMSEC. (AF)
65. United Kingdom and Turkey Communications Upgrade Program. (AF)
66. Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRI-TAC). (AF)
67. NATO F-16 Electronic Warfare Intelligence Support. (AF)
68. Saudi F-15 Electronic Warfare Intelligence Support. (AF)
69. The Greece Update (Communications). (AF)
70. Review of Nuclear Warhead Requirements. Provides Staff Supervision for all Assigned Nuclear Weapons. Prepares Quantitative Nuclear Weapons Requirements for Submission to JCS and DNA. (AF)
71. The Development of Conceptual and Operational Plans as Directed by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. (AF)
72. The Preparation of Operational Annexes for the Conduct of Aerospace Defense of the North American Continent. Includes USN and USMC Fighter Forces. (AF)
73. Supervising ADCOM Permissive Action Link Operations and Providing Management and Verification Functions to Army. (AF)

Lead Service Functions-continued

74. Providing Data and Analysis and Analytical Studies for HQ Canadian Defense Staff, JCS, NMCC and Navy. (AF)
75. Providing Full-Scale Aerial Target Support for PQM 102 to Army, Navy and Marine Forces. (AF)
76. Managing and Directing the Air Combat Manuevering Instrumentation (ACMI) Systems. (AF)
77. Launch CQM/10B Missiles as Targets in Support of Many. (AF)
78. Custodial and Maintenance Functions of US Material Placed in Canada. (AF)
79. Providing B-57 Target ECM Aircraft for US Army Ground Training. (AF)
80. Providing Electronic Strike Force of Air Defense System Training. (AF)
81. Providing Band Support to All Military Bases in Specified Areas. (AF)
82. Development and Implementation of Computer-Aided Tactical Information System (CATIS). (AF)
83. Military Flight Inspection of NAVAIDS. (AF)
84. Traffic Management Services for all Military in Selected European Countries. (AF)
85. Establishment and Maintenance of USEUCOM Airlift Requirements. (AF)
86. Provide Common Service Military Land Transportation and Water Terminal Service in Selected European Countries. (AF)
87. Responsible for the Preparation of USAF Hurricane Evacuation Plan. (AF)
88. Providing Weather Support for US Army. (AF)
89. Providing Weather Support for NMCC. (AF)
90. Providing Weather Support for ANG/AFR. (AF)

Lead Service Functions-continued

91. Providing Weather Support for Unified/Specified Commands. (AF)
92. Providing Space Environmental Support. (AF)
93. Providing DoD Weather Plotting Chart and Data Requirements. (AF)
94. Management of the DoD Rocket-Sonde Network. (AF)
95. Management of the DoD Global Weather Intercept Effort. (AF)
96. Allocates Direct Satellite Data Coverage Among the Services. (AF)
97. Establishes Procedures for USAF/Navy Terminals in Automated Weather Network. (AF)
98. Providing C130E Annual Simulator Refresher Courses. (AF)
99. Coordinates with FAA on Matters Concerning Charter Air Carriers. (AF)
100. Represents DoD before CAB and FAA Concerning Air Transportation. (AF)
101. Establishes a Public Docket File Relative to International Air Transportation Cases. (AF)
102. Responsible for DoD Owned Airlift Resources and Procurement Airlift for Administrative Support. (AF)
103. Service B Test (Teletype Net) Used by FAA and Military Services for Flight Plans. (AF)

OSD FIELD ACTIVITIES

1. Washington Headquarters Services.
2. American Forces Information Services.
3. DoD Dependent Schools.
4. Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS).
5. Tri-Service Medical Information System (TRIMIS).
6. Office of Economic Adjustment.

ORGANIZATIONS REPORTING TO/OR THROUGH THE JCS

1. Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff (JSTPS).
2. Military Airlift Command (MAC).

DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY

1. Mileage Tables for Travel Allowances. (A)
2. Payment for Transportation Services. (A)
3. Payment of Job Corps Members. (A)
4. Homeowners Assistance Program. (A)
5. Chemical Munitions and Agents. (A)
6. Standardization of Automatic Test Equipment Language. (A)
7. Management and Use of Motor Vehicles. (A)
8. Research and Engineering of Specific Physical Security Equipment. (A)
9. Semi-Active Laser Guided Projectile. (A)
10. Armed Forces Professional Entertainment Program Overseas. (A)
11. Defense Information School. (A)
12. Operation of the United States Receiving State Office. (A)
13. Industrial Security Claims. (A)
14. Settlement of Federal Tort Claims Generated by DoD Employees. (A)
15. Settlement of Incident to Service Claims of Department of Defense Employees Under the Military Personnel and Civilian Employees Claims Act. (A)
16. Payment of Reimbursements to Certain Foreign Countries Under 10 USC 2734a/2734b. (A)
17. US Representative to the NATO Intellectual Property Group (Formerly Working Group on Industrial Property). (A)
18. Management of Armed Services Patent Advisory Board. (A)

Delegations of Authority-continued

19. US Representative to Technical Property Committees Under Technical Property Agreements. (A)
20. Joint Consolidated List. (A)
21. Representation of DoD in Proceedings Before the Postal Rate Commission. (A)
22. Acts as Legal Advisor and Represents the Department of the Army, Other Military Departments, DoD, DCA, and at times, All Executive Agencies of the Federal Government in Proceedings before Federal and State Regulatory Agencies that are Involved in Regulatory Rates, Charges, Practices of Communication and Public Utility (Gas, Electric, Water, Sewage, etc.) Companies. (A)
23. Pentagon Counterintelligence Program. (A)
24. Audit of the American National Red Cross. (A)
25. Inspection of Headquarters EUCOM and SOUTH/COM on Collection of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with DoD. (A)
26. Inspection of the United States Soldiers' and Airmens' Home (USAAH). (A)
27. Inspection of the Army and Air Force Exchange System (AAFES). (A)
28. Military Blood Program Office. (A)
29. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. (A)
30. Defense Medical Materiel Board. (A)
31. DoD Wage Fixing Authority. (A)
32. Defense Systems Management College. (A)
33. Per Diem, Travel and Transportation Allowance Committee. (A)
34. Forms Management Program Artwork. (A)
35. DoD Nonappropriated Fund Compensation Program Wage Fixing Authority. (A)

Delegations of Authority-continued

36. DoD Wage Committee. (A)
37. Defense Telephone Service-Washington (DTS-W). (A)
38. Defense Supply Services-Washington (DSS-W). (A)
39. National Capital Region Building Management Services. (A)
40. Pentagon Motor Pool. (A)
41. Personnel and Employment Service-Washington. (A)
42. Heraldic Projects. (A)
43. Armed Forces Graves Registration Office (ASGRO). (A)
44. Civil Functions Activities of the Corps of Engineers. (A)
45. Privately Owned Vehicle Import Control Program. (A)
46. Operation of Arlington National Cemetery. (A)
47. Construction. (A)
48. Fallout Shelter Surveys. (A)
49. Construction for NASA. (A)
50. Solar Energy Cooling and Heating Demonstration Construction for ERDA. (A)
51. Energy Plants Construction for ERDA. (A)
52. Postal Construction. (A)
53. Construction in Saudi-Arabia. (A)
54. Promotion of Rifle Practice/Civilian Marksmanship. (A)
55. Support and Upkeep of the Vice-Presidential Residence. (N)
56. Preparation of Navigational Almanac for Use by Other Services, The Merchant Marines, etc. (N)

Delegations of Authority-continued

57. Maintenance of Library Facilities at the Naval Observatory, Which are Accessible to all Persons Interested in Astronomy. (N)
58. Provision of Administrative and Logistics Support to Unified Commanders. (N)
59. Program Management Responsibility for Joint Cruise Missile Program. (N)
60. Defense Resources Management Education Center at the Naval Post-Graduate School. (N)
61. Defense Activity for Non-Traditional Education Support (DANTES). (N)
62. Operation of Youth Conservation Corps (UCC) Programs on Military Installations and Support Services to YCC. (N)
63. Navy Relationship with Maritime Schools. (N)
64. DoD Assistance in Support of Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Operations. (N)
65. Establishment of Navy/NOAA Joint Sea Ice Forecasting Center. (N)
66. Protection of Offshore Assets. (N)
67. Exchange of Sea Surface Temperature Data. (N)
68. Amendments for National Cancer Institute/Naval Research Laboratory (NCI/NRL) Neutron Cancer Therapy Trials. (N)
69. Research Projects in Field of Inertial Confinement Fusion Design. (N)
70. Oil Spill Supplies and Services. (N)
71. Loan or Transfer of Navy Aircraft and Support Services to NASA. (N)
72. Utilization of Deep Submergence Research Vehicle (ALVIN) (DSRV ALVIN). (N)
73. Joint Program of Advancing Blade Concept of Helicopter Technology. (N)

Delegations of Authority-continued

74. Central Point of Contact-for Naval Oceanography Involving DoD Interests. (N)
75. Operational and Logistical Support Provided to the National Science Foundation for the United States Antarctic Research Program. (N)
76. Logistic Support and LC-130 Aircraft Operations for the US Antarctic Program. (N)
77. DoD Acquisition Manager for Tactical Digital Facsimile (TDF). (N)
78. Automatic Text Message Handling System (ATMHS). (N)
79. Logistic Support for Aerial Radiological Survey of Northern Marshall Island. (N)
80. Operation and Manning of the National Press Center at Andrews Air Force Base. (AF)
81. Joint Service Armed Forces Day for the National Capital Region at Andrews Air Force Base. (AF)
82. The Operation and Management of Selected National Range or Test Facilities. (AF)
83. Negotiate, Enter Into and Administer Contracts For and In the Name of the NATO AEW&C Program Management Organization (NAPMO). (AF)
84. Chairman of the DoD Space Shuttle User's Committee and Approves the DoD Space Mission Model. (AF)
85. Development, Production, and Deployment of all Launch Vehicles, Including Launch and Orbital Support Operations. (AF)
86. Design Reviews and Test of Adaptive HF. (AF)
87. US-Switzerland Offset Agreement. (AF)
88. US Member on the NATO Quality Assurance Sub-Group Responsible for Developing/Changing NATO Quality Assurance Policy and Procedures. (AF)
89. DD Form 1569 (Incident/Complaint Report), SD Form 1805 (Violation Notice), DoD Private Vehicle Registration Decal (Proposed) and the Physical Security Equipment Program. (AF)

Delegations of Authority-continued

90. DoD Investigative Responsibilities in Iran. (AF)
91. Conducts Defense Investigative Service in Various Overseas Countries. (AF)
92. Counter-Intelligence Information Collection in Various Overseas Countries. (AF)
93. Investigations Training to Allied Countries. (AF)
94. Operates the Protective Service Operations/Counter-terrorism School. (AF)
95. Coordinates Development of Body and Vehicle Armor for Protective Services Security Community-Wide. (AF)
96. Provides Fraud and Criminal Investigative Support for Approximately 25% of the Defense Logistics Agency Locations Worldwide. (AF)
97. Provides Technical Surveillance Countermeasure Support to Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. (AF)
98. Plan for Redistribution of the Range Measurement Laboratory Assets. (AF)
99. Mission/Task-Invention Disclosure Review Board. (AF)
100. Transportability Agent for the Air force and Air Transportability Agent for the DoD Engineering for Transportability Program. (AF)
101. Provide for Scientific and Technical Intelligence Analysis to Support Air Force Requirements and DoD and Other Intelligence Agency Requirements. (AF)
102. R&D Programs such as Maverick (Laser and 11R), Laser-Guided Bomb Procurement, Joint Tactical Information Distribution System; Lead Service for Targets (Full Scale and High Altitude Supersonic), Joint Service Weapon Data Link, GATOR Air Delivery Land Mine, Multiple Stores Ejector Rack, Air Inflatable Retarder, Base and Installation Security System, Automated Technical Control Digital European Backbone, TRACALS and Maintainability Standardization. (AF)

Delegations of Authority-continued

103. Obtaining and Maintaining Files of Letters of Assurance from Non-Profit Institutions of Higher Education and Other Non-Profit Institutions. (AF)
104. Combat Theater Communications. (AF)
105. Programs and Operates the DoD Landing Gear Test Facility at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. (AF)
106. Operates the DoD Reliability Analysis Center. (AF)
107. Develops Mapping and Charting Technology for the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA). (AF)
108. Operates the Federal Legal Information Through Electronics (FLITE) Program. (AF)
109. Acts as Counsel in Behalf of DoD for Selected Suits in Which DoD or the Secretary are Named Parties. (AF)
110. Preparation of Reports to Congress on Pending Legislation Stating the Position of DoD. Drafting Legislation on Behalf of DoD. Drafting Positions for DoD on Enrolled Enactments. Drafting Proposed Executive Orders for DoD. (AF)
111. Sole Procuring Agency for DoD Form 1482, MAC Transportation Authorization. (AF)
112. Postal Functions in Panama and Saudi Arabia. (AF)
113. Inventory Manager for System 463L Pallets and Nets. (AF)
114. Special Command Position Quarters. (AF)
115. Regional Council Liaison Officer for DASD(I&H). (AF)
116. Subsistence Support for all Services on Okinawa. (AF)
117. Prescribes Tour Lengths for Various Oversea Areas and Designates Which of the Military Services has Primary Responsibility for Submitting Recommended Changes to ASD(MRA&L) for Approval. (AF)

Delegations of Authority-continued

118. Establish Inter-Service Work Groups for Civilian Personnel Data Elements. (AF)
119. Provides Civilian Personnel Data Systems Support for Defense Mapping Agency (DMA). (AF)
120. Explore the Feasibility of an Automated Exchange of Certain Data between the Military Services and the Veterans Administration for Separated Service Members. (AF)
121. Conducts Aerial Spray Missing Using UC-123K Aircraft. (AF)
122. Provides Formal Training in C-130A Aircraft to MAAG, USN Personnel and Foreign Military Personnel. (AF)
123. "Host Service" for US Installations in the Azores. (AF)
124. Update and Distribution of the US Air Force Foreign Clearance Guide. (AF)
125. Updates and Distributes the USAF Special Weapons Overflight Guide (SWOG). (AF)
126. Develop Joint Air Transportation Service (JATS) Plan. (AF)
127. Washington Tactical Switchboard. (AF)
128. Provide Environmental Support to the National Command Authorities; the National Military Command System; Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; HQ USAF; Joint Reconnaissance Center; Defense Intelligence Agency; and HQ, US Army. (AF)
129. Development, Maintenance, Publication and Distribution of the DoD Military Retired Pay Manual. (AF)
130. Maintenance and Publication of the DoD Military Pay and Allowance Entitlements Manual. (AF)
131. Selected Areas of the Worldwide Military Command Control System (WWMCCS). (AF)
132. Manager for the DoD Working Dog Program. (AF)

Delegations of Authority-continued

- 133. Responsible for DoDD 4120.15-L, Model Designation of Military Aircraft, Rockets and Guided Missiles. (AF)
- 134. DoD Representative to North Atlantic Systems Planning Group. (AF)
- 135. US Delegate to NATO Air Traffic Control Working Party. (AF)
- 136. DoD Advisor to the Chairman of the US Delegation to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Obstacle Clearance Panel. (AF)
- 137. S&T Intelligence Production Aerospace Systems. DoD Primary Production Agency for Designated Areas of S&T Intelligence Production under DIA Delegated Production Policy. (AF)
- 138. DoD Manager for Manned Space Flight Operations. (AF)
- 139. Management Agent for Development of the Continental US Airborne Reconnaissance for Damage Assessment (CARDA) Plan. (AF)
- 140. US Representative to NATO Allied Technical Communication Agency Air Working Group. (AF)
- 141. Operate Consolidated Confinement Facility in United Kingdom. (AF)
- 142. Process DoD School Teachers Payroll at Selected European Bases. (AF)
- 143. Perform Budgeting/Funding for International Headquarters Support. (AF)
- 144. Responsible Agent and Manager for Joint Service Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming and Interference (MIJI) Program. (AF)
- 145. DoD Representative to the FAA (DOT) and Inter-Agency Group on International Aviation (IGIA). (AF)

There are five additional Delegations of Authority for the Air Force which are classified.